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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs) have received extensive
attention due to their vast benefits in academia and industry alike. However, due to the
overall magnitude and harsh characteristics of underwater environments, standard wireless
network techniques will fail because current technology and energy restrictions limit under-
water devices due to delayed acoustic communications. To help manage these limitations we
utilize Information-Centric Networking (ICN). More importantly, we look at ICN’s paradigm
shift from traditional TCP/IP architecture to improve data handling and enhance network
efficiency. By utilizing some of ICN’s techniques, such as data naming hierarchy, we can
reevaluate each component of the network’s protocol stack given current underwater limi-
tations to study the vast solutions and perspectives Information-Centric architectures can
provide to UANs.
First, we propose a routing strategy used to manage and route large data files in a net-
work prone to high mobility. Therefore, due to UANs limited transmitting capability, we
passively store sensed data and adaptively find the best path. Furthermore, we introduce
adapted Named Data Networking (NDN) components to improve upon routing robustness
and adaptiveness. Beyond naming data, we use tracers to assist in tracking stored data loca-
tions without using other excess means such as flooding. By collaborating tracer consistency
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with routing path awareness our protocol can adaptively manage faulty or high mobility
nodes. Through this incorporation of varied NDN techniques, we are able to see notable
improvements in routing efficiency.
Second, we analyze the effects of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on upper layer protocols.
Since UANs are typically resource restrained, malicious users can advantageously create fake
traffic to burden the already constrained network. While ICN techniques only provide basic
DoS restriction we must expand our detection and restriction technique to meet the unique
demands of UANs. To provide enhanced security against DoS we construct an algorithm to
detect and restrict against these types of attacks while adapting to meet acoustic charac-
teristics. To better extend this work we incorporate three node behavior techniques using
probabilistic, adaptive, and predictive approaches for detecting malicious traits.
Thirdly, to depict and test protocols in UANs, simulators are commonly used due to their
accessibility and controlled testing aspects. For this section, we review Aqua-Sim, a discrete
event-driven open-source underwater simulator. To enhance the core aspect of this simulator
we first rewrite the current architecture and transition Aqua-Sim to the newest core simu-
lator, NS-3. Following this, we clean up redundant features spread out between the various
underwater layers. Additionally, we fully integrate the diverse NS-3 API within our simula-
tor. By revamping previous code layout we are able to improve architecture modularity and
child class expandability. New features are also introduced including localization and syn-
chronization support, busy terminal problem support, multi-channel support, transmission
range uncertainty modules, external noise generators, channel trace-driven support, security
module, and an adapted NDN module. Additionally, we provide extended documentation
to assist in user development. Simulation testing shows improved memory management
and continuous validity in comparison to other underwater simulators and past iterations of
Aqua-Sim.
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Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Introduction
Oceans make up a fundamental part of our ecosystem while covering 71 percent of earth.
Underwater Acoustic Networks (UAN) play a crucial role in monitoring and extracting in-
formation from this unique environment. These networks represent a widespread assortment
of applications including scientific discovery, environmental tracking, commercial usage, and
defensive purposes [1–5]. Each of these application areas within UANs contain various pro-
tocols and constraints requiring a broad range of proposed solutions.
Due to the harsh environment of UANs simply mimicking Terrestrial Wireless Network
(TWN) strategies is ineffective. UANs have many limitations such as high propagation
delays, low data rates, and are apt to high bit error rates [6–10]. Additionally, it has
been found that radio waves suffer from high attenuation in water resulting in restricting
communication to only a few meters [2, 4, 11]. Instead we must adapt unique solutions such
as acoustic modems and specialized underwater protocols to better manage these limitations.
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2Furthermore, we must adjust each network protocol layer including routing, synchronization,
median access control (MAC), and localization [12–18].
In traditional network protocols the typical TCP/IP stack is applied due to its evolved
and accepted state. These standard tools use a host-to-host connection to communicate and
transfer necessary information. Due to the ever-expanding nature of technology, over the past
few decades, we see a large increase in network traffic and Internet connectible devices [19].
For this reason, Information-Centric Networking (ICN) architectures have gained popularity
due to their paradigm shift away from traditional IP networking [20]. Instead ICNs are
centralized around data dissemination and management to assist this growth in Internet
traffic. Various techniques of ICNs include information-centric routing, forwarding strategies,
and overall content focused network management.
In this dissertation, we address the adaption of ICN within UANs, reviewing and apply-
ing new approaches to UANs. Due to the original nature of ICN, a standard port to UAN is
not possible due to the many challenges of UANs. Instead we must selectively adapt certain
techniques that can be manipulated to fit the many underwater challenges. Furthermore,
this dissertation reviews the many improvements that can be seen by taking this unique
approach in handling different protocols of UANs. And finally, we extend past UAN simula-
tion capability to support ICN, with the goal to better simulate system and protocol design
around this new avenue of work. The goal of this dissertation is to help bring attention to
this introduction of ICN and spur new ideas and innovative strategies that can push the
UAN researching community further.
31.1.1 Underwater Acoustic Networks
UANs are made up of various sensor devices, buoys, and underwater vehicles covering a
large spatial area of interest. UANs are also known and recognized by the name Underwater
Sensor Networks (UWSN)s and in this work will be used interchangeable. Due to the usage
of acoustic communication among UANs, there is a steep propagation delay compared to
TWNs. Acoustic transmissions propagate through water at a rate of roughly 1,500 m/s.
This communication speed may vary slightly based on environmental conditions such as
water temperature, salinity, and modem depth. Due to this propagation delay, packets can
take one or multiple seconds to travel a single modem-to-modem hop away.
Underwater acoustic modems also suffer from low data rates. This limitation is mainly
due to signal absorption, multi-path channels, and fading. For example, if we look at Evo
Logic’s S2C R 48/78 acoustic modem [21] or AquaSeNT’s AM-D2000 [22] we see data rates
up to 31.2 kbps and 1.5 kbps, respectively. If a file of 1 Mb were to be transmitted, such
as a high quality image, we would see very high delays due to these low data rates. UANs
are also susceptible to high bit error rates. External noises, such as shipping, wind, thermal,
and aquatic life are typically the factors in these high packet errors [23].
Typical UAN architectures consist of one or multiple buoy nodes, behaving as network
sink(s) to collect data which can then be transmitted, via Radio Frequency (RF), to a
nearby boat, separate buoy, or satellite. Since underwater devices lack connectivity with
RF modems, GPS and other standard localization techniques are obsolete. Sensor nodes are
commonly anchored to the sea floor and transmit data through acoustic communication to
the network’s sink. Typically, we see either consecutive transmitting of all data gathered
or passively collecting data and storing locally (in regards to the anchored sensor nodes).
Therefore, it is dependent on the application, UAN size, and planned network lifespan in
4regards to managing data. UANs can range from hundreds to thousands of meters in size.
More mobile-prone devices can include autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), remotely
operated underwater vehicles (ROVs), and free floating sensors.
Underwater devices without a self propelling mechanism suffer from additional limita-
tions. Some examples of these limitations include node mobility, energy constrains, prone
to security threats, and costly deployment and upkeep. Due to water currents, deployed
acoustic devices can shift their location in the UAN [24]. Limited energy supply, within
devices, can also put strain on UANs [12, 25]. While surface nodes can typically rely on
solar or wave dynamic power generation [26], sea floor nodes are dependent on their internal
battery. These batteries require either periodic recharging or underwater energy harvesting,
which can be limited in charging capability or expensive. Additionally, devices with corded
connection, supplying power and fiber transmissions, may not be plausible based on the
UANs application, deployment location, and network robustness.
UAN applications can vary from marine life tracking, phenomenon detection, defensive
usage, and other research avenues. In multiple hop networks it is important to ensure
accurate and best route transmissions to increase transmission efficiency. Due to the expense
of many of these applications, we must ensure proper testing of protocols used and network
layout prior to deployment.
1.1.2 Integration of Named Data Networking
Named Data Networking (NDN) is one of many architectures within the centralized idea
of ICN. NDN was created to alleviate some of the shortcomings of traditional TCP/IP due
to the overwhelming new technologies connected to the Internet. We see this in categories
like Internet of Things (IoT), where smaller, household devices are receiving capability to
5connect remotely to home networks. New technologies, like the increase in mobile devices,
have led to a large increase in modern day Internet traffic [27], which has led to architectures
such as NDN growing in popularity.
There is a stark difference in data management between NDN and UANs. For example,
NDN typically resolve propagation delay as negligible due to the wired connection or RF
supported channels. In contrast, UANs suffer from large propagation delays due to the
acoustic channel properties. To fully utilize the benefits of NDN in UANs, we must integrate
adapted components of NDN to better conform to UANs many restrictions. By further
analyzing the benefits of applying NDN within UANs, we can start to see the potential
improvements that can be made.
1.2 Contributions
Following this direction, the contributions of this work include reviewing and integrating
ICN in UANs. Beyond overcoming the various difficulties in merging components of these
diverse networking types we review the impact on various layers in the network stack. This
dissertation is separated into three major topics of work.
1.2.1 Routing Strategy
In sizable applications a given network may want to sense and track information with a large
set of sensing nodes. In a typical UAN, all sensed data would be sent to the network sink
node. Due to the many delays previously mentioned in acoustic networks this can quickly
lead to heavy traffic concerns with excessive transmissions. Furthermore, if we are sensing
large file types this issue will be exacerbated.
6However, we can transition our network to passively store sensed data and only transmit
information on demand. This creates a new problem of finding where data is stored and its
most efficient routing path. Typically, flooding protocols can be used in this case to search
for data. Although, this technique creates excessive transmissions and overall wasted energy.
To assist in this issue we propose Tracer assisted Passive Named Data Routing (TPNDR)
protocol for UANs [28]. Through the use of NDN related ideology, we adapt a naming
category scheme for all data within the network. Furthermore, we adapt a passive, user
requested data median. Specifically, the end user must request data in query, allowing for
more meaningful file transmissions. TPNDR uses tracers, which populate the UAN, based on
the frequency of sensed data types. Therefore, we can use this data recognition to determine
the best routing path in a robust and adaptive manner. We use adapted forwarding strategies
from NDN to adjust how TPNDR handles user queries and corresponding data. Through
the use of these techniques TPNDR can outperform standard flooding techniques in UANs.
Simulation results show energy efficiency performance gains when compared to flooding in
terms of overall energy and network size.
1.2.2 Security Strategy
Like many TWNs, security plays a critical role in UANs. Due to the many vulnerable
components of acoustic networks we must ensure that our packets reach their destined sink
without originating from malicious users and resources are not mismanaged due to attacker
interjection. Certain components of UANs are more susceptible to attacks, such as the open
channel of acoustic networks which allow for anyone to interject noise or information.
To understand malicious attacks we review Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. These se-
curity threats target restricting communication and reducing modem energy allotment by
7creating malicious packets to overwhelm a targeted device or the whole network. Addition-
ally, since UAN modems are typically lacking computational power and high localization
accuracy, we must adjust how we approach this type of security threat in comparison to
TWNs.
To approach this problem we take a multi-step process in detecting and restricting one
or multiple DoS attacker(s) from freely attacking an UAN [29, 30]. Firstly, we introduce
adapted NDN components to help restrict typical DoS attacks from occurring. This works
by reducing redundant request packets seen within the UAN. In the case that an attacker
adjusts their malicious packets to meet these new restriction factors we introduce a detection
table recording neighboring nodes behavior such as mobility, channel usage, and information
requests. If we notice consistent malicious behavior, such as large portions of false requests,
our proposed algorithm activates a restriction phase for a limited period of time. This
restriction phase adjusts its sensitivity to attacker behavior based on consistency of DoS
attacks, allowing for less false positives.
If a malicious user where to advance their DoS attack further our preset detect and
restrict algorithm may fail due to its set assumptions. Instead it is necessary to introduce
machine learning for more advanced node behavior analysis. We implement three techniques
to assist in detecting more difficult attackers through statistical, adaptive, and predictive
approaches. By using our basic detect and restrict algorithms, as well as our three node
behavior techniques, we see advanced DoS attacker restriction. Thorough simulation results
show the effectiveness and accuracy of our applied algorithms in various DoS scenarios.
81.2.3 Simulation Integration and Advances
Simulators offer the capability to test protocols and network structures without the cost and
time investment of real-world deployments. With the expansion of research and testing of
UANs, simulator software must keep up-to-date in terms of supported protocols and mod-
ules. Furthermore, we must ensure that these simulators are intuitive to use with extensive
documentation for users and developers alike.
In terms of network simulation one of the more popular tools in the past has been NS-2
[31]. This NS-2 framework offers a broad array of different components to support network
simulation. In recent years, NS-3 [32] has been constructed to outperform and improve the
many shortfalls of NS-2. Aqua-Sim 1.0 [33] was created as a module that works on top of NS-
2 to specifically simulate UANs. Additionally, since Aqua-Sim 1.0 has been a collaborative
effort over a span of a decade, we have a disbanded view on our software architecture. We
identify these problems in Aqua-Sim 1.0 and re-purpose the simulator code in an open-source
software we call ”Aqua-Sim Next Generation” [34, 35].
To assist in this issue we break the problem down into architecture support, protocol
integration, new module support, and NDN integration. Firstly, we restructure the previous
Aqua-Sim 1.0 architecture to be more centralized and realistic. One example of this is in the
physical layer which allows for the modem to distinguish if a received packet is decodable
based on channel characteristics like noise and packet collisions. Additionally, this restructure
consists of transitioning from NS-2 to NS-3. Due to the vast differences between NS-2 and
NS-3, we were forced to rewrite large portions of previously supported protocol code to ensure
legacy protocol support. By adding new real-world features, such as synchronization and
localization modules, we are able to close the gap between simulation and real-system testing.
We also introduce adapted versions of NDN to expand the ideology of ICN within UANs.
9Furthermore, this allows for additional capability to extensively test the proposed NDN
region in UANs for other research scientists. Lastly, we considerably expand documentation
on the simulation’s architecture, packet flow, protocol design, and installation instructions.
Experimental results show greatly increased simulation performance, in regards to Aqua-
Sim 1.0 and other UAN simulators. We also validate our results, in comparison to previous
real-world tests, through analyzing various UAN protocol’s simulation results.
1.3 Dissertation Roadmap
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: first, we give a thorough back-
ground of ICNs and, more importantly, NDN and its beneficial components. Then, we
present TPNDR, an NDN adapted routing layer protocol in Chapter 3. Next, in Chapter 4,
we review and analyze our algorithm for DoS detection and restriction, as well as node be-
havior algorithms proposed. In Chapter 5 we thoroughly discuss challenges, improvements,
new modules, performance results and validity of our underwater simulator, Aqua-Sim Next
Generation. Lastly, we conclude our dissertation and offer future research directions in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Information-Centric Networking
For decades networking practices have used host-to-host driven connection. This concept
has been extensively studied and tested concluding with the current IP Internet architecture
we use today. This architecture takes a conversational view in which we have source and
destination addresses layered within IP to support endpoint communication. Furthermore,
various protocols can be used to pass and manage data between these two points. This
end-to-end communication becomes indistinct when we look at the vast new technologies
that are being integrated into the Internet. Such things as mobile devices must be able to
interact, through wireless medians such as 5G, to connect to radio towers and then transition
to wired Internet structures. Other advances, such as IoT, prove to be another hurdle in
which we must handle an influx of new traffic from various Internet-connectible devices
[27]. Additionally, the current main approach for IP architecture security is to integrate
various protocols for channel end-to-end protection. This typically falls short of secure
10
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communication and instead leaves the security verification on the application or end user.
By reviewing these and other shortfalls of the Internet architecture, based on its primary
usage, we see the proposal of ICNs. ICNs are a paradigm shift away from the Internet
infrastructure through the introduction of named data to drive Internet communication.
By decoupling information from location we can instead enable in-network caching and
different means of transportation. Furthermore, we can introduce benefits such as improved
communication efficiency, better scalability, and increased network robustness. Additionally,
we see potential improvements in data management, such as integrated packet security to
help deter malicious users.
ICN is a broad reaching architecture design that has seen many different proposed vari-
ations over the past decades. One of the first proposals related to content-based networking
was TRIAD [36]. In this work, the authors proposed extending the Internet using content
routing techniques. Following this we saw IETF by Baccala, containing a proposal of an early
ICN framework [37]. Data-Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [38], from UC Berkeley,
was one of the first detailed versions of ICN design. DONA uses persistent names instead
of URL addresses, while also allowing for network cached information and cryptographic
verification of data. In more recent years we have seen a large expansion in ICN designs
and architectures. A few ICN oriented projects include PSIRP [39], 4WARD [40], COMET
[41], CONVERGENCE [42], NDN [43], CCN [44], MobilityFirst [45], and ANR Connect [46].
More thorough survey on ICNs can be found at [20]. Additionally, the ICN Research Group
(ICNRG) is leading ongoing topics and discussions of ICN related areas [47].
By comparing the different ICN architecture designs we can construct a more thorough
idea of which structure would be best for UANs. To accomplish this we review and summarize
the findings in [48]. In two sections of this work the authors break ICN designs down by
their commonalities and differences.
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The main commonalities seen across ICN designs include a publish and subscribe paradigm
at a global-scale, caching capability, and directly securing the content. For the terminology
of publisher and subscriber this can be water-downed to a content producer or creator, and
a consumer, respectively. Caching capability requires that all ICN nodes are able to cache
information. This means that when receiving a request, a node will either provide the data
cached locally or will need to request cached information from its peers. Content-oriented
security, within the commonality of ICN designs, integrates security within information itself
instead of through Internet paths. This is orchestrated by signing content at the publisher
and allowing for verification or validity through this signature at intermediate nodes or the
subscriber.
In terms of differences among ICN designs we see variations in naming schemes, inter-
domain route handling, and architecture’s narrow waist. For naming we see two different
forms for ICNs: first being human readable addresses, similar to DNS protocol, or, second,
non-human readable key bounded names. These have various strengths and weaknesses
such as the ability to break down an address for scalability or easier key integration for
verification techniques. Inter-domain routing focuses on how we manage routing techniques
in comparison to current TCP/IP routing strategies. The narrow waist currently used in our
Internet architecture is IP. For various ICN designs we see the issue of where this new narrow
waist should reside. Namely, this clashing narrow waist view regards if ICN communication
should run on top of IP or replace it.
Overall, we see many beneficial components from ICNs that could directly relate to
UANs. Some of these benefits include more tolerant networks in regards to routing holes
and delays, robustness, energy efficiency, and integrated security. Since we are able to
cache data internally, ICN can lead to reduced number of hops when accessing redundant
or repeated content. Furthermore, we transition to a user initiated querying system, or
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subscriber system, in which cached content resolves around user interest.
2.2 Named Data Networking
2.2.1 Contrast with Other Architectures
NDN is a paradigm shift on how we view and use the Internet. This project is meant at
shifting away from host-to-host connections and instead transitioning to a data centralized
structure. This can be viewed as changing the way we use the Internet to be ’what’ informa-
tion are we looking for instead of ’where’ is this information located. Therefore, we can adapt
our applications and data management to be more information specific. By contrasting cur-
rent IP based architecture with NDN we can see even more potential differences. NDN steps
away from securing channel communications for all transmissions and instead secures data
individually. By making this security transition NDN allows for various levels of security
which can be granularly introduced through securing data dependent on the application in-
stead of IP address. For example, if an application wanted to verify that all incoming data
for a website request was created and signed by the same trusted producer, NDN could do
this while IP could not. Where IP architecture puts the strain of the problem on the ap-
plication instead of inherently allowing for security with NDN architecture. Compared with
typical IP networking, NDN introduces caching capability on all NDN nodes. This allows
for content to typically be fetched in less hops with faster retrievals of information, since a
data request may not have to be routed all the way to the producer. IP packets incorporate
the ”thin waist” of the typical Internet architecture, allowing for a universal component
across various network types. Additionally, this has allowed each Internet layer’s protocols
to evolve independently. For NDN we see content chunks taking on this ”thin waist” ter-
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minology. Therefore, allowing different networks to exist and evolve uniquely, while sharing
a commonality through this NDN content protocol. Another contrasting view between IP
and NDN designs is scalability. In NDN, they include unbounded name space giving the
capability to better control name space, at a global scale, when increasing in network size.
In comparison, IP addresses are limited in space leading to noticeable issues in past Internet
expansion [49].
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) and NDN have similar roots in ICN. The CCN
project was originally created by Van Jacobson at PARC in 2007 [50]. CCN led the devel-
opment of a software codebase to represent this proposed architecture. While NDN relates
to the NSF-funded Future Internet Architecture project started in 2010. Additionally, NDN
originally used CCNx [44] as its code base, and then later forked off its development in 2013.
Where PARC holds intellectual property of CCN and its ongoing work, while NDN is meant
for university-based research experimentation. Therefore, CCN and NDN continue to evolve
alongside each other with some parallel ideas, while containing some differences, beyond the
project developer(s). On NDN’s site they claim, in comparison to the CCN project, that
their work focus is directed at addressing open questions such as ”not as much forwarder
modularity, API ease-of-use, and trust management tools as we felt were needed.”
2.2.2 Architecture
To depict this new visual of the NDN architecture it is fitting to use an example breakdown
of the different layers present in comparison to the current Internet design. For this we
examine a figure from NDN’s site reviewing the hourglass form of these architectures [43],
shown in Fig. 2.1.
The first noticeable difference is the ”thin waist”, in which each architecture is centralized.
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Figure 2.1: Internet and NDN hourglass architecture (CC By 3.0).
This design assists in creating a global interconnectivity no matter what application or
protocols are in use. In regards to NDN, these content chunks allow for data naming when
finding information in query or retrieving data from a cached location or producer. In the
upper application related layers we see the individual security layer. This section of NDN
provides a built in security capability through signing all named content. By making this a
requirement, it changes the scope of security to be node and application specific in content
trust-ability and verification rules. When reviewing individual layers for NDN we also see
techniques including differentiated forwarding and routing plane. This allows for NDN to
run on top of current forwarding techniques, such as IP or Peer to Peer (P2P), while routing
strategies can be enhanced or evolved independently. Additionally, NDN has architecture
features to assist in self-regulating traffic. This flow balancing is supported through user-
created requests and corresponding data responses, helping to eliminate open loop data
passing.
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2.2.3 Components
To orchestrate NDN’s content driven design, it first must re-purpose packets and what they
contain. For this we use the words consumer to illustrate a subscriber or user querying some
type of content, and a producer who originally creates some type of information. In this con-
text we see two types of packets form: interest and data. Interest packets contain the content
name in query, data preference or any application related details, and a cryptographic nonce.
For a data packet we see the content name, the producer’s signature, signed information for
routing strategy and publisher identify purposes, and the corresponding data. Furthermore,
these packets can be broken into chunks to assist in network flow balancing.
To fully support named networking, NDN must incorporate a naming structure that can
be used across different applications. For this we see the use of a naming hierarchy, in
which names can be broken down by prefixes, with a similar feel to DNS. This allows for
more flexible routing among global and local scope. For example, if a user wanted to find
a research paper on routing within the UAN community the interest packet may contain a
content name such as /UConn/CSE/UAN/Routing/VBF. Fundamentally, this can be broken
down dependent on scope of current route, if the content does not reside on the current NDN
node. Therefore, a node may forward this interest towards a known /UConn naming prefix
route and allow other nodes to handle finding this data. If the information has not been
cached within the network, we can use this naming hierarchy to search for a known producer
for where this paper should reside, namely /CSE/UAN/Routing. In this manner, NDN’s
naming content is typically application specific and uses scopes to limit the necessity for
unique naming and interest conflict avoidance.
NDN nodes use three different techniques to manage communication: Pending Interest
Table (PIT), Forwarding Information Base (FIB), and Content Storage (CS). FIB serves as
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a lookup table for where an interest packet should be forwarded based on its named content.
This table is populated through name related routing protocols. Once corresponding data
is found that matches the interest packet, this newly created data packet will return to
the consumer using the reverse path taken to find the data on the network. Since NDN
packets do not carry host information, interest and data routes are handled by keeping state
information at each router hop. The PIT stores all unsatisfied interests and their associated
application information. By maintaining this table we are able to collapse duplicate content
interests and only forward the first interest packet towards a data source. Once an interest
entry within the PIT is satisfied (data packet arrives with a matching name) NDN will
remove the associated entry and multicast the data packet to all previous requesters. There
are many areas of ongoing research for routing strategies in NDN. Many different routing
applications have been proposed [51, 52] as well as different forms to populate lookup tables
[53]. Since NDN is targeted at data awareness and in-network caching, the architecture also
uses the CS to cache recently received information from data packets. Many different forms
of data management have been proposed to improve and specialize how routers can cache
content for future requests [54, 55]. Furthermore, this storing component is meant to reduce
redundant data sending that can be seen in certain scenarios of IP networking. For example,
if a mobile device is requesting information while changing its Internet access point during
communication, this can lead to additional networking issues such as requesting duplicate
copies of information.
Information-centric security provides additional communication reliability in NDN through
the use of producer signatures, trust management, network security, and content protection
[56, 57]. This is facilitated through a mandated data signature to establish data provider
information without necessarily acquiring said data from a given provider’s location. Addi-
tionally, applications can encrypt keys within NDN data for easier distribution.
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2.2.4 Applications
NDN was originally created to address the various issues apparent in standard wired Internet
connections. Furthermore, this typically means applications and nodes presumably use dif-
ferent input and output interfaces, allowing for easier packet management. For more diverse
networks, such as ad hoc networking, this becomes slightly more difficult. For instance in
Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) communication is wireless and therefore input and out-
put must be managed internally instead of physically switching to a different wire. Besides
this issue of adapting NDN to wireless networks, we still see many benefits. For example,
VANETs information-centric strategies can make crowd sourcing data manageable [58] while
also reducing the need to form a central server side to contain requested information. NDN
has also proven to be helpful in P2P file sharing [59] and cloud trust-ability [60]. These are
just a few examples in which the current TCP/IP approach already has similar application
information-centric integration, while introducing NDN exposes new network level impacts.
Furthermore, we see a broad range of name look up and synchronization proposals to assist
in DNS-like naming services [61, 62]. The NDN architecture has also been shown to work
with real-time streaming [63, 75].
Beyond the currently proposed applications for NDN, the community has also provided
a multitude of codebases for various platforms. To name a few there exists NFD (NDN
forwarding daemon) [65], ndnSim (NDN module run on NS-3 simulator) [66, 67], NLSR (link
state routing protocol) [51], and Mini-NDN (a lightweight emulation tool) [68]. These tools,
among many, are just a glimpse at the ever growing field of NDN in various applications.
When discussing NDN applications we typically review terrestrial network scenarios.
These networks, which may be wired or wireless, tend to contain various assumptions such
as available resources and network capabilities. These assumptions, in regards to UANs,
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can be dangerous since they relate to using RF modems, negligible transmission delays, or
containing an abundance of energy through power harvesting, large battery sizes, or other
means. When relating NDN applications to UANs we can start to see that many of these
assumptions become false. For example, TWNs can assume with mobile devices that using
GPS can greatly help offset localization issues, while in UANs this positioning system is
unusable (apart from water surface connected equipment). Many other differences include
limited data rate capability and high transmission delays, as previously mentioned. To
avoid the complexity of interjecting a new networking paradigm into UANs, we choose to
adapt certain components of NDN to assist in circumstantial situations. In the rest of this
dissertation we take this approach to cover areas such as energy efficient routing, integrated
denial of service security, and new module support in UAN simulation.
Chapter 3
Named Data Routing
3.1 Background & Related Work
With the expanding growth of diverse applications available for UANs, so comes the re-
quirement to properly manage increased energy constraints. Furthermore, due to the many
limitations of underwater environments, such as high mobility rates, we must ensure adapt-
able routing schemes. To approach this work we first must analyze the problem at hand and
review the possible routing solutions currently in place.
In various applications UANs may span several kilometers or more, collecting vasts
amounts of data for research or monitoring purposes. This large amount of collected data can
quickly become encumbering for routing schemes which rely on shortest and most efficient
path to a network’s sink. This is apparent in networks transmitting larger data payloads
over multiple hop scenarios. For example, given a scenario with high resolution images or
videos captured at the sea floor which must traverse multiple nodes before reaching the sink.
By reviewing typical acoustic propagation speed of 1,500 m/s and acoustic modem data rate
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of 10 to 60 kilobits/s we can quickly see the potential downfalls of transmitting large, 1Mb
or greater files, without known, adaptive, shortest path routing. One of the more common
forms of collecting UAN information is automatically pushing all sensed data to the sink
without caching any information locally. This can be problematic in scenarios, such as pre-
viously mentioned, which contain large traffic and transmission delays due to larger datasets
being sensed. Dependent on the application’s requirement for data collection frequency we
can quickly see that the amount of collected data will exceed the limitations of the UAN,
thus requiring a separate approach for internal data storing and routing. By implementing
an information fetch and retrieve system we can transition to a user generated retrieval
process. In scenarios with high node mobility or modem failure, the efficiency of this basic
approach may still falter since optimal routing paths may become obsolete.
One standard routing principal used in UANs when searching for unknown data location
is a flooding approach. Usage of this type of protocol can be found in underwater works
such as [69, 70]. Certain assumptions like smaller network size are made to help improve
flooding efficiency. Other approaches may use more targeted flooding, which helps minimize
the amount of network which is flooded with the information in query. In either case we see
excessive transmissions and ineffective solutions if the routing path is to change or sever due
to mobility or node failure. We also see terrestrial-based solutions such as [71, 72], which
use path reinforcement and redirection to adaptively analyze network transmissions. By
using reinforcement, terrestrial networks typically adapt traffic flow using energy awareness,
congestion control, and shortest path information. While direct diffusion disperses data to
reduce node stress and anticipate future data paths. Since these approaches are seen using
TWNs several assumptions fall short when applied to UANs. These include GPS localization,
full flooding for path recognition, and symmetric channel conditions. A more passive form
of data routing introduces AUVs as a transportation vessel from storage to sink. Since the
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AUV can move freely among the UAN, on a predetermined trajectory, it can visit each node
and exchange any necessary information. While this approach can effectively collect large
amounts of data stored within the network, it incorporates various overheads. By requiring
an external device to collect and move data we incur an unnecessary data retrieval delay
while also adding additional complexity such as AUV deployment and retrieval costs.
3.2 Proposed Protocol Design
To accommodate for various data locations throughout the UAN we choose to transition to
a NDN routing approach. Therefore, we store data within the network, such as within the
node which collected the information, and utilize user created queries for searching. Since
there may not exist a correlation between node location and sensed information, or this
connection may change over time, we choose to instead allow an adapted NDN approach to
search for data in query instead of by node location. Additionally, this allows us to test out
various NDN techniques in a UAN setting, which, at the time of this research and based on
our surveying, was a novel approach.
In this work we expand this NDN design while also introducing tracers to adaptively
decide best routing paths. This proposed protocol is named Tracer assisted Passive Named
Data Routing (TPNDR). We make several assumptions in this work related to the harsh
nature of UANs and exceeding the transmission limitations of the network. Firstly, we
assume that data is sensed and stored locally to reduce network strain of transmitting each
piece of collected data. Secondly, we assume the possibility for either nodes or collected
data to shift within the UAN. An example of this could be an application created to track
the movement of aquatic life within a large testbed and capture high quality imagery or
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recordings. Therefore, we must store information locally within the network to extend the
longevity of the UAN while ensuring that routing paths, to fetch data, are adaptive without
requiring excessive flooding. In larger UANs these assumptions become more prevalent due
to larger surface areas containing more nodes which greatly lengthen transmission delays.
We also make the assumption that once a sink receives the targeted data it is outside of
the limitations of UAN due to potential resources such as RF communication and renewable
energy access, and therefore falls out-of-scope of this routing protocol.
In TPNDR we introduce five adapted concepts which are transitioned to fit UAN charac-
teristics which include: Pending Interest Table, Forward Information Base, Content Storage,
naming conventions, and tracers. While many of these topics have been previously reviewed
in NDN, we independently adapt each one to better fit a wireless, underwater constrained
environment. Since sensed data is passively stored on local memory within nodes, we must
allow for sink nodes, typically buoy devices, to request information by name. Additionally,
we must use TPNDR to acquire the most energy efficient route while reducing potential
redundancy when requesting the data in query. Furthermore, since many UAN resources
are restrained we go against typical NDN philosophy and assume bounded name entries for
interest and data packets alike. For interest packets this restriction can reduce transmission
costs while placing more weight on correctly categorizing naming conventions of collected
information. For data packets, this bounding is related to packet size, resulting in packet
chunks transmitted in sequence.
3.2.1 Adapted Pending Interest Table
The key functionality of the PIT used in TPNDR is similar to standard NDN procedures.
We use an integrated PIT on each node to keep track of all name entries and corresponding
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requesters. In Fig. 3.1 we see a basic depiction of these PIT fields. The name specifics
the unique named entry in query. The requester ID can hold one or multiple node IDs.
Additionally, we include a timestamp field to resend an interest packet in the case of highly
unstable channel conditions. To properly manage PIT size this timestamp can also offer
entry removal after a preset amount of time has expired. This timer expiration could be a
result of either the unique name not residing on the network or not on the given path for
which this node resides. By incorporating this adapted PIT, we can take advantage of NDN’s
duplicate removal feature. It is important to note that this PIT is meant to be a minimized
and adapted version of the original NDN architecture. This difference is, in part, due to
terrestrial NDN using router interfaces to manage their routing schemes while in UANs we
have shared acoustic channels with severely larger communication delays.
On receiving a data packet, a PIT will ensure an entry for this name already exists
followed by transmitting the packet to all given requesters. In this way we incorporate
a multicast feature at the node which received duplicate name requests. Furthermore, in
this adapted version we allow multiple data variations of a targeted interest to be received
separately. This means that if different nodes within an UAN have similar data collected
that are classified under the same name both data packets will be retrieved for a single
interest packet. This could be beneficial in the case that a user wants to request all high
quality images containing a specific underwater mammal which has been captured within a
given timespan. While the user may not know how many different devices have data that
satisfies this query, we can instead allow TPNDR to figure this out for us. In comparison,
NDN uses a strict one interest to one data response to manage flow balancing. While this
NDN approach is reasonable, we believe that in unique UAN applications, such as the one
currently explained, our approach will allow for a more proactive stance in collecting all data
in query. Fig. 3.2 shows this data packet handling for a PIT. In the case that no PIT entry
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Figure 3.1: Adapted Pending Interest Table entry fields.
Figure 3.2: Data packet handling for the adapted PIT.
exists for the data received, the corresponding node will drop this packet. This is due to
NDN using the same path for both the interest and data packet by keeping path state within
the PIT.
3.2.2 Adapted Forwarding Information Base
Each node will also contain a FIB, similar to standard NDN principles. We give a general
review of a FIB entry in Fig. 3.3. Our FIB categorizes each entry by unique name and it’s
corresponding path features. With the most basic field containing the next hop towards the
data in query. We also include information such as round trip time (RTT), path status, and
a stale timer. These extra features allow us to determine what is a suitable amount of time
it should take to receive a data packet response on this given path, as well as include any
notable information such as heavy traffic path or low energy node(s). In collaboration with
the RTT, we also incorporate a stale timer to ensure this routing path has not become stale,
in regards to locating the unique name. In the case that a path has gone stale, such as not
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satisfying one or multiple interests, the next hop path field can be removed for the given
name entry on the FIB. Additionally, our FIBs support multiple paths for a single named
data. For this we allow a single name entry to contain multiple next hop neighbors, each of
which are a unique, non-looping, path to a data source. Since reoccurring interest packets are
reduced to a single entry with our PIT, routing loops are removed. Additionally, since data
packets will only traverse the reverse path of its corresponding interest packet, routing loops
are removed for data packets as well. Therefore, our FIB allows for an adaptive approach
dependent on data location and path development. It is important to note that FIBs are
populated in TPNDR through the use of tracers, which will be discussed later in this section.
When receiving a data packet, such as seen in Fig. 3.2, we repopulate our FIB fields before
forwarding the packet. By monitoring data packet behaviors, such as RTT and path status,
we can continuously update our FIB without the need of excess packet transmissions.
In Fig. 3.4 we review the general flow in handling an interest packet. In the case that a
node contains content to satisfy the given interest, a data packet is created and forwarded
upstream, towards the requester. From here we follow the typical ideology of a PIT and
FIB, in which each table is checked for an entry matching the interest packet’s name and
handles it accordingly. In the case that a node’s PIT lookup finds a matching interest entry
we add the requester to the related entry and drop the interest packet. Furthermore, this
means that a duplicate interest packet resides in the network and has already been sent
downstream, towards where the data resides. If a known path is found on the FIB then the
interest packet will be sent towards the next hop neighbor gathered from our FIB table.
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Figure 3.3: Adapted Forward Information Base entry fields.
Figure 3.4: Node handling scheme using adapted NDN concepts.
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3.2.3 Naming and Content Components
Caching content within the network is one of the fundamental features of the NDN archi-
tecture. Since the purpose of NDN is to find the data in query instead of the IP address
this is an important part of providing efficient and reliable routing schemes. However, due
to the many limitations already in place for UANs we see a very different viewpoint on how
effective internal caching can be within the entire network. Namely, we see the case of stale
data and wasted resources as the main two problems in caching data content beyond the
initial storage of newly sensed information. First off, if we are consistently caching content,
this information may quickly become out-of-date due to incurring high UAN delays during
transmission. Additionally, any data being fetched is typically transmitted to a surface buoy
or off network device with extended resources. In the case of transmitting data packets
to a buoy we can theoretically use newly available features such as solar energy harvesting
and radio frequency communications to send information faster and more reliably. Since
this transition to out of network capabilities removes the many limitations seen in UANs it
seems senseless to store information on each hop during data packet routing. Furthermore, it
would be more appropriate to store large datasets at off site locations such as cloud services
or terrestrial servers due to their enhanced capabilities and greatly reduced delays. For this
routing work we disregard the use of content caching on relay nodes while acknowledging
the potential effectiveness of in-network storage in certain applications.
In TPNDR we assume a preset naming convention which is standardized across the entire
UAN. Each name can be broken down into prefixes which assist in classifying the information
as well as any additional requirements in query. For example, a user could directly search
for high quality images of alpheid shrimp, also known as snapping shrimp, which are red
in hue. Therefore, our routing scheme would first direct this interest packet towards known
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shrimp prefixes and, if need be, the subcategory red. This of course is application specific,
but shows the overall idea of routing towards data instead of typical address, as seen in IP
architectures. Additionally, this allows for more flexible interest packets that can search for
a group of data or a precise name. Each sensing node collects data, categorizes it based on
the preset naming convention, and stores it locally. A transmitted size limit can be placed
on returning data requests to avoid overloading the network if an interest prefix is too broad
or satisfies too many groupings of information. Furthermore, since we bound data packets
by splitting them up by chunk size, highly error prone sections of an UAN can route with
less negative packet loss effects due to retransmitting.
3.2.4 Tracers
Since sensed data location is unknown and may vary in the UAN, current work suggests using
flooding approaches to compensate. This type of technique wastes large amounts of energy
through excessive transmissions, especially in larger network sizes. Instead we propose using
tracers to form virtual routing paths from where the data is sensed to the network’s sink.
These tracers are meant to be small in size, containing a data name, ID of the acoustic sender,
and the timestamp when the information was first collected. The goal of these tracers is to
have minimal impact on excess network transmissions while creating adaptive routing paths.
Additionally, we define tracers as single directional communications towards the sink.
Each tracer contains a data name relating to the newly sensed data locally stored. For
example, an anchored sea floor node may capture information relating to a mammal’s activity
and can therefore send tracers towards the sink in relationship to the mammal’s naming
convention. Furthermore, tracers are only broadcasted once a predefined threshold is met
on each node. Thus, we restrict the possibility of a flood of tracers while allowing for virtual
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routing paths to form based on current data being sensed. Each formed path is naming
category specific, allowing for multiple paths to form based on collected UAN information.
For each sensed data or tracer received, relating to a specific naming category, we increment
a counter towards the naming category’s threshold. Additionally, within the FIB we reset
an entries stale timer each time a tracer of correlating name is received. Hence, a tracer
defines if a path is still fresh, meaning data of its naming category is still being commonly
sensed within this routing path.
All UAN nodes recursively repeat this name threshold and tracer creation process. Over-
time this creates routing paths from the sensed node location to the network’s sink based
on the type of data consistently being collected. Therefore, known routing paths will only
form for frequently collected and stored information while ignoring any potential outliers.
Furthermore, this could help remove issues that may arise from incorrectly sensed data. For
time critical applications, a priority system can be implemented which forces transmission
of either a tracer or the data itself ignoring all threshold cases. If UAN nodes should fail
or sensed data becomes nonexistent our FIB stale timers will ensure timely removal of this
corresponding routing path. With continuous use of tracers new naming category paths can
form in an adaptive and robust manner.
To fulfill the need to immediately populate a UAN with routing paths, we also implement
a learning phase within TPNDR. This phase reduces all nodes’ thresholds for a short time
followed by returning all thresholds to their predetermined values. Trending named paths
can therefore be quickly populated while still allowing for adaptability over time. This
learning phase can be ignored by setting both pre and post threshold values to be identical.
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3.3 Experimental Results
To validate TPNDR we conducted experimental evaluates in regards to energy performance
and necessary protocol settings. Due to the uniqueness of adapting NDN components in a
UAN routing protocol we choose to compare TPNDR with its closest data discovery protocol,
adapted flooding. Our simulation was created to review underwater transmission delays and
accurate packet handling. The simulator was written in C++ as a standalone program. We
used a topology consisting of 22 nodes spread out in a 10km by 4km area. Specifically, we
use a single surface buoy acting as the sink, 11 relay nodes, and 10 sensor nodes set at the
simulation floor. For simplified simulation purposes these sensor nodes represent clusters of
many nodes spread out in a mesh grid. Each node is spaced with a gap of no more than 1km
for reasonable transmission ranges. No restriction is placed on table sizes or internal memory
storage, since we are strictly testing routing performance of TPNDR. Naming convention was
constrained to two naming groups with several categories within each grouping. We depict
the learning phase within our simulation by starting all nodes with a threshold of one. This
phase lasts for 1,000 seconds before transitioning all thresholds to their preset value. This
phase length was chosen to roughly match the time it takes to construct a full known routing
path from sensor node to sink. While it is important to note that this learning phase time
can vary depending on network size, sensing frequency, and network node density.
Once the learning phase is complete, we must analyze what the consistent threshold
value should be set to. By adapting the threshold value we directly affect the amount of
tracer transmissions. Therefore, by reducing the amount of transmissions we can make the
assumption of less energy used within the UAN, while also incurring a delay in routing path
creation. In Fig. 3.5 we show the simulation results of network node’s threshold value.
Each test in this scenario lasts for 10,000 seconds. Data sensing occurs every 200 seconds
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Figure 3.5: Threshold value for each node using TPNDR protocol.
on each sensor node with varying frequency of naming category. From this figure we can
see a steep drop off in total transmissions at a threshold value of 2 or greater. In the case
of a threshold value of 1, there are similar behaviors to a regular UAN routing protocol in
which all collected data is sent to the sink. Expanding to a threshold value of more than 5
shows little overall transmission change given our simulator settings. For this reason, we set
the remaining simulation results to have a threshold value of 5 once the learning phase has
expired.
We next review unique naming conventions and, more importantly, the effect of poor
name categorization. In the worst case for naming data, each sensed data category would
have a path to the surface with possible redundancy among data groupings and excessive
tracer transmissions. In this testing we removed the learning phase and ran our simulation
for 30,000 seconds. With each sensing node’s frequency set to once every 60 seconds. Fig.
3.6 shows the results of varying unique name categories. Based on the outcome there seems
to be a linear relationship between the amount of unique name categories and the network’s
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Figure 3.6: Unique data named categories for TPNDR protocol.
total transmissions. This result shows that with extensive misuse of commonly sensed data
categories we see a direct increase in transmissions and, indirectly, energy used.
For better comparison purposes our simulated flooding protocol extends beyond a typical
flooding approach through the use of targeting and information retention. Similar to TP-
NDR, this flooding protocol’s goal is to search for sensed data that has an unknown location
and return one or multiple collections or variations of the data in query. To help improve
upon the inefficiencies seen in standard flooding practices, we incorporate sectional query
flooding, which targets sections of the UAN that contain information of interest. Addition-
ally, this flooding protocol maintains past data retrieval information, providing recognition
of previously located sensed data. Furthermore, we limit data types within their network
sectors for this adaptive flooding protocol which allows for more reliable searching without
entire UAN flooding.
To measure protocol energy efficiency we reviewed total transmissions for both TPNDR
and the adaptive flooding protocol previously mentioned. Fig. 3.7 depicts the comparison of
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Figure 3.7: Total transmissions sent for TPNDR and adaptive flooding protocols.
these two protocols. In this figure the TPNDR protocol assumes that all transmitted packet
sizes are equal. Then, we incorporate the assumption of smaller tracer sizes, namely tracer
packets that are half the size of regular packets, and denote our findings as TPNDR v2.
From the results, we see that TPNDR outperforms our adaptive flooding protocol in either
packet size case.
Since TPNDR was developed to improve energy efficiency in larger networks, we next
review UAN size scalability. For each protocol and varying network size we run our simulation
for 20,000 seconds with a consistent flow of generated information requests and newly sensed
data. Additionally, we assume each cluster of sensor nodes are distributed in an even manner
throughout the UAN, while the number of relay nodes and sink remain static. Results of
these simulation runs are shown in Fig. 3.8. From this outcome, we see that TPNDR can
outperform adaptive flooding in cases of larger network sizes. Additionally, this shows that
while flooding may be beneficial in smaller networks, due to its low overhead, it quickly
becomes inefficient in comparison to TPNDR.
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Figure 3.8: Network size, denoted in sensor node clusters, compared with protocol
transmissions.
Since TPNDR uses components like FIB and PIT, it is necessary for us to measure the
robustness and adaptiveness of discovering routing paths. To accomplish this we must change
what type of sensed data is collected over time. We determine the consistency of TPNDR’s
virtual routing paths by denoting each time a tracer reaches our network’s sink. This depicts
the tracer’s data type still maintains a routing path from the sink to related information
stored in the network. Additionally, we incorporate our FIB’s stale timers to determine at
which point are routing paths removed from our simulation. Our stale timers are set to
slightly above the round trip time from a given node to the data source and back. During
these tests we periodically introduce and remove sensed data types and analyze how TPNDR
reacts. In total we use six different data categorizations for this section of simulation testing.
Results are shown in Fig. 3.9. In this figure, each sensed data type consists of two markers,
one signifying the integration of this data within our UAN, and the second representing the
removal. Sensing frequency for all node clusters is set to 0.1 ms. Furthermore, all nodes
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contain a learning phase lasting for 1 second before setting all tracer thresholds to 3. Stale
timers are set dependent on their network location in comparison to sensed data nodes.
We also include our adaptive flooding protocol in these tests. Due to the nature of flooding,
this protocol creates consistent paths to all sensor nodes with the trade-off of reduced energy
efficiency. For TPNDR, we see a slight delay when sensed data types become available until a
full routing path is formed. This delay is in direct relationship to our tracers and each node’s
tracer threshold. Additionally, we introduce brief occurrences of sensed data, representing
outlier or falsely detected information. In these limited cases, such as Sensed Data 3, we
see no path formation to our network’s sink which is related to our tracer thresholds and
overall tracer frequency. For this reason, we conclude that while TPNDR incorporates a
delay in forming routing paths to stored data, the protocol does ensure that each data type
has consistent sensed frequency and adaptivity.
3.4 Discussion
In this work, TPNDR is in the very early stages of introducing NDN techniques within
UANs. This work serves as a proof of concept for the integration of information-centric
architecture in underwater scenarios. By adapting these new networking principles we see
many possibilities in reducing the harsh limitations seen in the UAN environment. Further-
more, this opens the door to other potential protocols enhancing energy usage in various
applications and scenarios.
While within this context our solution shares characteristics with other underwater flood-
ing techniques, the main goal of TPNDR was stepping away from the many limitations in-
curred by flooding. For example, in [73] we see the usage of directional flooding to reduce
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Figure 3.9: Formed paths from sensed data source to network sink.
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standard flooding expense in UANs, while in [83] we see the usage of back-off timers and
eavesdropping to reduce redundancy of flooding. In these examples and many other vari-
ations of underwater flooding we see the standard usage of IP networking. Although this
is not a limitation it does require enhanced adjustment and adaptation in certain applica-
tions, such as introducing multicast routing capability or node address discovery. While in
TPNDR we transition to an information-centric architecture providing a broader range of
capabilities, such as data specific searching.
Other similar work to TPNDR include video and large file transmissions for real-time or
near real-time information capturing. In [74], we see an in-depth review of underwater video
transmissions. Alongside this have been many potential improvements to standard real-
time video transmissions using NDN, such as [75]. By incorporating both of these concepts,
improvements to further enhance large file transmissions can be made without suffering
from factors like lossy compression schemes. Additionally, we believe factors like in-network
caching and stronger information-centric schemes could lead to more robust energy efficiency
through mitigating the effects of harsh UAN conditions. Therefore, components such as NDN
adapted routing may play a larger part in improving these application specific limitations.
For TPNDR, in particular, there are still many areas that could be improved. Within
each node’s FIB resides a status field which is meant to analyze traffic paths and enhance
network efficiency. By further investigating this trait, in terms of acknowledging low energy
or strained nodes, we believe TPNDR may be able to better recognize potentially faulty
paths and adapt appropriately. Furthermore, issues such as over-saturation in the case that
a single interest packet returns multiple data packets requires further work. By introducing
solutions such as limited time-to-live per an interest packet we could better limit the distance
a packet could traverse from the sink. Additionally, this limiting factor could be directly
related to proper name prefix usage and, therefore, is left for future work. Other areas
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of future direction include more densely constrained networks or analyzing the effect of
noncontinuous network connectivity.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we review the many limitations in collecting and transmitting large files
in sizable UANs. To overcome these shortfalls we introduce Tracer assisted Passive Named
Data Routing (TPNDR), a routing protocol which introduces NDN techniques and tracers to
create energy efficient routing paths to passively stored data. In this way, we review a passive
sensing environment, that collects large amounts of sensed data, stores it locally, and only
transmits information from user-generated queries. By incorporating this passive approach
we can reduce the amount of redundancy in transmitted information while allowing users
to request information. We use tracers to adaptively form paths, dependent on the named
category of sensed information, creating routing paths from the stored data to the network’s
sink. Furthermore, TPNDR uses stale timers and data frequency thresholds to ensure that
all paths are strongly correlated with data currently being sensed. Through experimental
results we show TPNDR’s effect on reducing redundant packets as well as providing adaptive
and robust routing paths. Additionally, we compare an adaptive flooding scheme with our
protocol to show the improvements TPNDR has on energy efficiency.
Chapter 4
NDN Adapted Underwater Security
4.1 Background
Security is a paramount area in many of today’s networks while requiring improved commu-
nication reliability and trustability. This holds true in UANs, in which certain applications
may be transmitting sensitive information or have time critical scenarios. To this end, we
need to ensure that security protocols can assist applications which are sensitive to tempo-
rary halts in network traffic or premature node failure. Additionally, applications such as
harbor defense or tsunami warning systems may require time critical packet sending and
therefore can not adapt to increased delays.
4.1.1 Denial of Service
To further analyze security threats in UANs we must first discuss how a specific attack could
occur and what possible malicious motives may be involved. For this we choose to review
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Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The typical goal of a DoS attack is to overwhelm a targeted
node using network-connected devices to simultaneously request information. Therefore,
the node (e.g. system’s server) will be put under extreme stress trying to respond to the
large flux of traffic and drain its resources. These types of attacks, and more specifically
distributed DoS attacks, are a large concern in terrestrial networks. With the increase in
Internet-connected devices we consequently see an increase in potential attacker nodes, as
seen in [76]. This type of malicious behavior has led to the creation of various businesses to
analyze terrestrial network traffic and block potential DoS threats [77, 78].
UANs are susceptible to DoS attacks as well. Since UANs use wireless communication
malicious hosts can try injecting attacker nodes to replicate a DoS attack. Additionally,
UANs are already hindered by limited energy resources and decreased network throughput
(compared to their TWN counterparts). This makes the effect a malicious user has on
directly increasing traffic load more apparent.
To offset DoS impact on UANs we must first analyze what types of attacks could occur
based on the network limitations and environmental factors. For this we look at two different
attack types; focus and spread DoS attack. A focus DoS attack consists of one or multiple
attackers creating excess traffic to overwhelm a single point within the network. An example
of this is shown in Fig. 4.1, where the attackers (highlighted with a dotted red border)
inject malicious traffic into the UAN. Additionally, the target for this example is the far
right node to where all broadcasts funnel. While a spread DoS attack separates the target
of the attack, consequently affecting multiple areas of the UAN. Additionally, this attack
type takes advantage of an UAN’s limited energy resources by spreading out the DoS attack.
This increases overall packet traffic while also making the malicious device(s) more difficult
to detection. An example of a spread DoS attack is shown in Fig. 4.2, in which the attacker,
highlighted in a dotted red border, uses the broadcast nature of UANs to switch its target
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Figure 4.1: Focus DoS attack with multiple attackers using acoustic communication.
Figure 4.2: Spread DoS attack using acoustic communication to transition between multiple
targets.
node throughout the DoS attack. Therefore, all broadcast packets, in this example, are
from malicious origin causing all network nodes to waste energy by passing these attackers’
packets. If left unattended, either of these DoS attacks can lead to higher traffic congestion
and even node failure. Additionally, this can cause routing holes, network bottlenecks, or
section isolation in the case that node failures restrict connection to whole areas of UANs.
Due to UAN’s half-duplex modem limitation and previously mentioned large delays, packet
communication will greatly suffer from DoS attacks.
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4.1.2 NDN Security
By adapting NDN techniques within our work we can tweak how we manage our security.
For this work we mainly focus on NDN’s beneficial packet types and routing strategies. Fur-
thermore, we can use these newly integrated techniques to assist in node behavior analysis.
To start, we use NDN packet types for easier name to content recollection. This allows for
naming hierarchy integration for routing strategies. Specifically, this allows for applications
to use naming prefixes instead of full interest name matching when routing packets toward
data sources. Additionally, we use PIT on all nodes to assist in interest and data packet
management. This integration provides packet information tracking dependent on producer
and consumer content. Through the use of a PIT we see the removal of redundant interest
packets by consolidating unique naming entries on each receiving node. This is extremely
helpful in denying typical DoS attacks, since a malicious user would normally have one or
multiply devices requesting the same information at a high rate. If an attack like this where
to occur, with a network supporting NDN nodes, then this attack could be blocked at the
leading NDN nodes. For this reason we assume that a slightly more advanced DoS attack
would occur consisting of adding slight variation among interest queries consequently making
each attack packet seem unique among our PITs. Therefore, the standard principles of packet
redundancy removal in NDN would be compromised. Furthermore, we make the assumption
that nodes have the capability to cache content. This resolves the case of an attacker or
normal node requesting the same content in succession. Additionally, these assumptions can
be satisfied, without additional proposed work, through the use of standard NDN techniques.
Therefore, in this work we strictly focus on security and related node behavior analysis.
In the case that an attacker creates fake packets, in the form of a DoS attack, a PIT
will consistently receive timeouts for entries originating from the attacking node(s). This is
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based off the assumption of caching content within network devices and having an attacker
consistently changing its maliciously generated queries to make them unique. By measuring
these PIT timeouts alongside other NDN related features we can spot potential malicious
interactions in our UANs.
4.1.3 Behavior Analysis
By thoroughly measuring and analyzing human behavior much incite can be gained [79].
New avenues of information gathering such as behavior clustering, anomaly detection, and
prediction models have received extension research and development. These techniques can
also be classified or closely related to machine learning.
Security fields sometimes describe the art of defending against attackers as a cat and
mouse game. On a general level this ”game” connects to the back and forth security and
attacker improvements that are consistently made, each trying to undo the opposition. In
our work, we review various machine learning techniques and study their analytical prowess
in regards to attacker detection. Through this integration we plan to use node behavior
recognition to assist in detecting and predicting an attacker. This becomes necessary since
a malicious user may heighten their attack by using environmental factors such as spatial
components for enhanced mobility. Or an attacker may take advantage of UAN’s acoustic
broadcast median to multicast fake interest packets while adjusting their attack pattern to
make themselves seem more ambiguous.
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4.2 Related Work
4.2.1 Underwater Security
Similar to other wireless networks, one of UAN’s critical components is maintaining secure
communication in varying scenarios and applications. Additionally, due to the many unique
characteristics of UANs new security components and vulnerabilities must be analyzed. To
this extent, many different works have been proposed to extensively survey and offer various
solutions for underwater networks. In [80] the authors use cryptographic strategies to create a
general security framework. This framework is meant to encompass and tailor to underwater
requirements by targeting all protocol layers besides the physical layer. The authors in [81]
and [82] propose layer specific vulnerabilities and discuss potential solutions. Additionally,
some work has been made in redundant packet restriction by using back offs in flooding
scenarios [83]. With a broader approach, [86–88] survey the various security threats apparent
in UANs and related solutions. These discussed attacks range from eavesdropping, jamming
attacks, packet or location spoofing, and sybil attacks. Additionally, we see some security
work focus on the physical layer solutions. In [84] and [85] we see discussion on DoS attacks
targeted at the physical layer in the form of channel jamming. These types of DoS attacks
use external noise to restrict channel communication at different intervals. While many
of these works propose various security components for UANs, they lack upper layer DoS
solutions.
Machine learning techniques cover a vast variety of publications with varying approaches
and algorithms. In [89] the authors give an overview of association rule mining models.
[90] proposes AdaR, a routing protocol for TWNs which uses reinforcement learning. This
approach takes samples of current routes and piggybacks the information on packets. Then it
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uses preset base stations to examine these samples and calculate new routing path weights.
A proposal using reinforcement learning in UANs can be found in QELAR [91]. In this
protocol the authors adapt their solution to be energy efficient when finding routing paths.
[92] proposes QDTR, a Q-learning based delay tolerant routing protocol. In this work, to
meet the limited energy restrains of UANs, the authors use node interaction history and
Q-learning to find energy efficient paths.
4.2.2 NDN DoS Security
DoS attacks are an ongoing issue in terrestrial networks and therefore have seen many pro-
posed solutions. Such as in [93, 94] we see defensive strategies for restricting against standard
DoS attacks. Furthermore, we have seen a proactive security stance in NDN published work
due to NDN’s beneficial routing strategies and architecture components. [95] is one of the
earlier papers in this area which discusses the contributions of NDN in taking steps to help
in mitigating DoS attempts. In [97] we see a more detailed approach on flooding attacks in
NDN, with a proposed scheme to detect and traceback the attacker using abnormal content
detections. The authors of [96] take a more proactive approach by creating Poseidon, a pro-
tocol for actively detecting and mitigating fake interest flooding in terrestrial networks. By
collecting information on wired connections, Poseidon works towards detecting DoS attacks
near their targeted server. Nodes which detected the DoS send out alerts to initiate a push-
back effect towards the attackers’ point of origin. While this work gives a detailed view on
DoS restriction, it lacks in direct portability to UANs due to its terrestrial network assump-
tions such as ample energy supplies and fast transmission speeds. Our work extends upon
Poseidon by specializing UAN characteristics and adapting machine learning techniques for
more accurate node behavior analysis.
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Figure 4.3: DoS detection table.
4.3 Proposed Solution
4.3.1 Detection and Restriction
In order to properly detect and restrict against a DoS attack we must first be able to identify
malicious behavior in our UAN. Additionally, we must adapt our detection scheme to fit
underwater constraints and maintain accuracy even in harsh environmental scenarios. To
accomplish this each relay node within the UAN must analyze its neighboring nodes looking
for abnormal characteristics. Through the use of a DoS detection table each network node
collects ongoing information for DoS detection. This new table takes into account channel
asymmetry, long propagation delays, and acoustic broadcast capability.
Fig. 4.3 shows the components of the DoS detection table. In order to keep track of
neighboring nodes each UAN device receives a unique ID. In this way, we can keep track of
packet origins if a possible attacker is detected. Furthermore, we accompany this ID with
a vector location to fully construct the identity of each node. Many different accurate and
energy efficient localization techniques have been proposed for UANs as seen in [98]. This
leads vector management and overall node localization to be application specific and outside
the range of this work. Therefore, we make the assumption that a loose localization vector,
for each node, can be maintained to remove the possibility of attacker location spoofing.
This also provides us with additional mobility information that can be used when reviewing
node behavior. The second column in our detection table figure is channel measurement.
This field measures packet ACK and NACK to gauge channel conditions of local traffic.
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This can therefore be used to offset our detection means and help reduce false attacker
detections if channel communication is highly unstable. Since external noise can directly
fluctuate error rates of transmitting packets, this is a vital field for UANs. The next field
in our DoS detection table is transmission dominance. In this category the residing node
measures the sending frequency of each neighboring node in comparison to all overheard
transmissions. Transmission dominance helps provide sending ratios for analyzing all traffic
related to abnormal behavior. The fourth field consists of the interest timeout ratio. This
timeout field directly works with a node’s PIT by measuring each neighbor’s ratio between
interest packets and PIT entry timeouts. Therefore, if we notice a high percentage of timeouts
with packets originating from a particular node we will begin to suspect this individual of
being an attacker. Since interest entries within a PIT are satisfied when receiving correlated
data, we use this idea to monitor traffic requests. Furthermore, in the case that a large
majority of a node’s interest packets are satisfied, within a PIT, we can likely assume that the
requesting node has non-malicious intent. Additionally, we introduce channel measurements
in this analysis to help offset the possibility that poor channel communication is not affecting
our timeout ratios. The last field within our DoS detection table is the PIT byte usage
component. In this field we review our PIT entries for each neighboring node and find the
ratio of table usage belonging to each neighbor. Typically, we may assume that with a
DoS attack we would see a large influx of packets being created to overwhelm the network.
Therefore, we can directly use the PIT byte usage to analyze if a possible attack is occurring
and from what node. While it is important to note that this assumption can be misleading if
legitimate interest spikes occur potentially creating false detections. To improve the accuracy
when using this DoS detection table we must combine various fields. To this means, we must
first declare three equations which can then be used in our proposed algorithm for attacker
detection and restriction.
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αi ∗ inti > intTi (4.1)
βi > βTi (4.2)
δi > δTi (4.3)
In every node’s DoS detection table there will be R entries which represent all neighboring
nodes. i depicts the ith node of R such that 1 <= i <= R. To simplify our UAN scenarios
we assume a fully connected network where all nodes, excluding attackers in some scenarios,
remain static. For Eq. 4.1 let αi be the channel measurement, inti be the interest timeout
ratio, and intTi be the preset interest timeout threshold. To ensure accuracy intTi should
be set to greater than the round trip time to receive a data packet based on the current
node’s position to all data sources. In Eq. 4.2 let βi be PIT byte usage and βTi the preset
PIT byte usage threshold. Similarly, in Eq. 4.3 let δi be transmission dominance and δTi
the preset transmission dominance threshold. While this approach includes slightly more
thresholds, compared to having a single threshold for PIT byte usage and transmission
dominance alike, it is necessary to allow for varying, independent DoS detection behavior.
Furthermore, these thresholds allow for adaptable attacker detection, mobility analysis, and
behavior examination which is discussed later in this chapter.
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4.3.2 Our Algorithm
To restrict against DoS attacks we must implement the DoS detection table and associated
equations. For this we use Eq. 4.1 to determine a neighboring node’s timeout ratio. As
previously mentioned, we use the channel measurement as an offset to distinguish between
environmental factors versus malicious behavior. In Eq. 4.2 and 4.3 we review transmission
dominance and PIT byte usage separately. All three of these equations use an independent
threshold variable that can be tweaked either by our proposed algorithm or by node behavior
techniques. By observing these thresholds we are able to declare if a neighboring node has
abnormal behavior and is potentially an attacker. Additionally, dependent on the specific
thresholds which are exceeded, we can declare what type of attack restriction steps should
be taken.
Alg. 4.1 shows our proposed DoS detection and restriction algorithm. This algorithm
is executed on each relay node, recursively, using a predetermined delay period between
executions. Each neighboring node, i, is analyzed to determine if its previous behavior
warrants it as a potential attacker. Since each network node can only overhear neighboring
nodes within communication range we denote detectionTable as the node’s DoS detection
table of unbounded space. We make this assumption based on the typical UAN node density
ranging in tens to hundreds of nodes with limited transmission range. Therefore a given
node’s DoS detection table will have a limited amount of entries and can be managed in
reasonable time and computational complexity. In our algorithm we break down the sections
by their predetermined goal. The FindEntryRatios(i) function provides the current ratios
in terms of Eq. 4.1-4.3 for neighboring node i. For lines 3 through 5 we review potential
DoS focus attacks and its associated pushback restriction mechanism. In lines 6 and 7 we
detect potential DoS spread attacks and implement a throttling phase. Finally, we collect
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ongoing information on node behavior in lines 9 through 14. This information can then be
managed in our three different node behavior techniques. These various behavior collections
focus on adapting to attacker actions over a larger period of time.
Algorithm 4.1: DoS Detection and Restriction Algorithm
Input: detectionTable
begin
1 for i := 1 to detectionTable entries do
2 FindEntryRatios(i)
3 if αi ∗ inti > intTi and βi > βTi
4 Reduce intTi and βTi ; // Pushback(i)
5 SendAlertPacket(i)
6 else if αi ∗ inti > intTi and δi > δTi
7 Reduce intTi and δTi ; // Throttle(i)
8 end if
9 SvmTable← SvmInput(i)
10 if SvmModelTrained()
11 SvmPredict(i)
12 end if
13 StatisticalTable ← detectionTablei
14 RulesMiningTable ← detectionTablei
15 end for
When discovering if a node is potentially performing a focus attack we incorporate Eq.
4.1. In this way we can decide if neighboring node i’s timeout ratio exceeds a preset threshold
value with the associated channel measurement offset. This comparison alone may not
be reliable due to network interest spikes creating false positives. Instead we couple this
comparison with Eq. 4.2. If both of these equations exceed their specific thresholds then we
begin the pushback phase. In this phase we reduce the specific timeout and PIT byte usage
thresholds for only the ith node. Furthermore, the node currently running this algorithm
will send out an alert packet to all neighboring nodes for this potential attacker as well as
restrict all incoming interest packets from this attacker’s ID for a given period of time. All
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network nodes who receive this alert packet will also reduce their associated thresholds for the
questionable attacker node. While this type of phase will not immediately stop an attacker
it will instead trigger nodes to become more sensitive to the ith node being an attacker. The
goal of this pushback is to completely restrict a focus attack, given a short detection delay
and assuming the DoS remains consistent allowing for network nodes closer to the attacker
to negate the negative behavior. Additionally, we incorporate threshold resets after a set
period of time, with no pushback alerts or attacker detection, to reduce inaccuracy in our
algorithm.
The proposed DoS detection and restriction algorithm must also target spread attacks.
Based on this type of attack’s characteristics we use both Eq. 4.1 and 4.3. Therefore, we
analyze the timeout ratio for the ith node as well as its transmission dominance. The goal
of this type of detection is to stop the malicious source at the point of network injection.
Since the spread attacker may constantly vary their targeted routing path when creating
malicious packets, we instead must measure how many packets are originating from each
neighboring node. If both timeout and transmission dominance thresholds are exceeded, in
these equations, then we begin the Throttle phase. Similar to pushback, we reduce both
threshold values for the ith node in question making it more susceptible to future throttling.
Additionally, we restrict interest packets generated from this node for a preset period of
time. Like the pushback sequence, we use a threshold reset after a given period of time in
which no spread attack is detected. This is important in the case of high network mobility
and potential for false positives.
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4.4 Behavior Adaptation
Given the intelligence and network knowledge of a malicious user the DoS attack may go
beyond the previous defensive strategies mentioned in Alg. 4.1. One noticeable shortfall is
if an attacker monitors traffic to predict how long until thresholds are reset. Therefore, a
malicious user could devise their attack around advantageously introducing delays within
their DoS to become more opaque to our restriction techniques. While this will limit an
attacker’s produced packets over time, it will still leave the attack on the UAN unhindered. If
left undetected ongoing DoS presence would affect the overall network lifespan. Additionally,
some UAN devices have active propulsion mechanisms, such as AUVs, allowing them to be
highly mobile within the underwater environment. AUVs and other similar underwater
devices can be propelled at a speed of 1 to 4 knots (or roughly 0.5 to 2 m/s). While this
speed may seem highly limited, in comparison to TWNs, it does pose a potential security
issue since malicious devices can greatly shift their location within a given UAN. For example,
if a malicious DoS device where to consistently move its point of attack within the UAN our
standard detection and restriction steps could not adapt. Instead our proposed algorithm
may be unable to restrict the DoS since the attacker may go out-of-range before being
classified as malicious. This would therefore lead to incorrectly resetting thresholds for the
mobile attacking node and classifying it as a false positive. These current limitations in our
detection and restriction methods show potential areas for attackers to adapt and persist.
To improve upon our previous DoS detection and restriction algorithm we introduce three
node behavior analysis models, or loosely based machine learning techniques. These models
are meant to improve our accuracy in restricting false acknowledgements of attackers and
regular nodes alike. The implemented node behavior models include statistical distribution
model, rules mining model, and support vector machine. Overall, the aforementioned mod-
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els provide a probabilistic analysis, pattern recognition adjustment and prediction model,
respectively. Additionally, the independent use of these three models enhances our DoS
security robustness for more advanced attack scenarios.
As seen at the end of Alg. 4.1, we collect node behavior information, related to the
previously described algorithm, as well as node mobility. Each model contains its own
individual collection of information. Additionally, each model’s algorithm is applied once the
collected information reaches a given size, n, which is predetermined and individually set.
This n value has been adjusted to best match our accuracy results found during simulation
runs. Within each model we receive a reporting score of either 0 or 1 for each neighboring
node analyzed. These scores depict the likelihood that the node is an attacker, with 0 being
not a malicious device and 1 most likely being an attacker. Additionally, the rules mining
model is set up to adjust threshold values as seen in its implementation.
4.4.1 Probabilistic Implementation
A statistical distribution model is typically meant to illustrate the probability of an event’s
outcomes given a population of information. For our model we use four metrics to assist
in finding our current probability distribution, namely, mobility change, pushback ratio,
throttle ratio, and PIT timeout ratio. By using these metrics and contrasting a node’s cur-
rent distribution with its previously recorded distribution, we are able to report an attacker
likelihood value. Our implemented model can be found in Alg. 4.2. The expected input
are coupled entries of neighboring node ID and a MLQueue. These MLQueues are struc-
tured queues with each entry containing the four metrics previously mentioned, presented
as normalized values between 0 and 1. For each neighboring node, i, our algorithm finds the
current distribution as seen in line 6. In the case that a previous distribution entry exists
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for i we take the absolute difference, compared with the current distribution, and normalize
the output as the reported score. Furthermore, we store the previous distribution for all
neighboring nodes, allowing for tracking of node behavior. In our statistical model we take
a pessimistic approach for reporting newly discovered nodes or recently active ones. In this
way, whenever we analyze a node with no previous distribution we mark it as having a 1 or
highly likely to be an attacker. Similarly, if a node goes out-of-range or is idle for a long pe-
riod of time we take a pessimistic approach by reporting a score of 1 once new information is
collected from this node. This approach allows our probabilistic model to hesitate on newly
acquired nodes or inconsistent behavior, without permanently branding a node as malicious.
Additionally, if a node is out-of-range or silent for a period of time, we do not compute its
score until new node behavior information has been collected from this neighboring node.
Algorithm 4.2: Statistical Distribution Algorithm
Input: StatsTable = (NeighborNodeID,MLQueue) entries
Output: NodeScores
begin
1 Create ScoreTable
2 for all NeighborNodeID ∈ StatsTable do
3 if MLQueue < minQueueSize then
4 Continue;
5 end if
6 currentDist← 1
n
∗∑n1 (MLQueue)
7 if previousDist exists then
8 tempScore← |currentDist− previousDist|
9 ScoreTable← (NeighborNodeID, tempScore)
10 else
11 ScoreTable← (NeighborNodeID, 1)
12 end if
13 end for
14 return ScoreTable
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4.4.2 Rules Mining Implementation
Rules mining model is typically used to discover the association between rule sets using
large datasets of collected information. This commonality can then be applied to adjust
current rules making correlations between variables more apparent. In this model, we use the
same four metrics as seen in statistical distribution model: mobility change, pushback ratio,
throttle ratio, and PIT timeout ratio. By implementing this model within our DoS detection
and restriction scheme our goal is to better define rules distinguishing malicious from normal
node behavior. For example, if we notice a strong correlation between high node mobility,
PIT timeout ratio, and pushback frequency, we may permanently decrease these thresholds
for a particular node making them more vulnerable to be detected if the behavior continues.
Our rules mining algorithm is given in Alg. 4.3. Similar to our probabilistic implementation,
the expected inputs are coupled entries of neighboring node ID and a MLQueue. For each
entry within MLQueue we analyze how many rules are compromised and determine if the
majority of rules are compromised. This model keeps track of each compromised entry to
be later used for association support, confidence rating, and rule adjustments. Based on
our current node behavior information we use four different rule sets, namely, (1) timeout
and throttle ratio, (2) timeout and pushback ratio, (3) mobility, timeout, and throttle ratio,
and (4) mobility, timeout, and pushback ratio. Additionally, if we notice a consistent trend
between components of a rule set we can adapt our rules for all nodes to better detect this
type of behavior. For example, if we see a strong correlation between mobility and potential
attacker habits we can adjust these specific thresholds so any nodes who act in a similar
manner will be detected more accurately. Furthermore, rules mining algorithm returns a
node score based on amount of compromised entries noted when analyzing each MLQueue
entry. For associate rule learning analysis we also include support frequency and confidence
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as seen in lines 22 through 25. While these findings do not directly affect a neighboring
node’s scoring or rule adjustment, they are meant to assist analysis of provided datasets and
rules for improved model performance.
Algorithm 4.3: Rules Mining Algorithm
Input: RulesTable = (NeighborNodeID,MLQueue) entries
Output: NodeScores
begin
1 Create ScoreTable
2 Create ComrpomisedEntryQueue
3 for all NeighborNodeID ∈ RulesTable do
4 if MLQueue < minQueueSize then
5 Continue;
6 end if
7 compEntries = 0
8 for all Entries j ∈MLQueue do
9 compRules← FindTotalCompRules()
10 if compRules > totalRules/2 then
11 CompromisedEntryQueue← j
12 compEntries← compEntries+ 1
13 end if
14 end for
15 if compEntries > j/2 then
16 ScoreTable← (NeighborNodeID, 1)
17 else
18 ScoreTable← (NeighborNodeID, 0)
19 end if
20 end for
21
22 for all Entries k ∈ CompromisedEntryQueue do
23 Count compromisedRuleFrequency ∈ k
; // for association support frequency
24 Count compromisedItemFrequency ∈ k
; // for association confidence
25 end for
26 AdjustRules()
27 return ScoreTable
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4.4.3 Support Vector Machine Implementation
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a group of supervised learning methods used for discrimi-
native classification. To separate a dataset into two classes, a SVM uses a hyperplane which
optimally divides these two groupings. By finding the largest margin that separates these
two groups we can use a trained SVM model to predict future data points and where they are
expected to fall within the current classification. To support this model, we used LibSVM
[99] due to its extensively supported library for SVM analysis. For our work, we choose to
classify our SVM dataset into neighboring nodes flagged as potential attackers and those that
have not been. This is completed in Alg. 4.1, in which we note if either a pushback or throt-
tle sequence occurs consequently flagging the associated node as a potential attacker before
collecting the information for future SVM model training. The SVM collected information
also consists of two indexes with the node’s PIT timeout ratio and max value of either the
transmission dominance or PIT usage. This collected dataset must then be reordered from
our DoS detection algorithm to meet LibSVM’s expected layout. We train and retrain our
SVM model every time the collected entries reach or exceed the minimum predetermined
size, n. For this model we decouple the node ID and instead only review the index values
and potential attacker value for each SVM entry. Once the SVM model is trained, we predict
future entries within our original DoS detection and restriction algorithm. This prediction
scheme uses the trained model and current SVM’s marginal hyperplane to declare if the
neighboring node, under review, is a potential attacker.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Simulation Settings
For testing our proposed work we analyze two approaches. First, we consider our DoS
detection and restriction algorithm in single and multiple attacker scenarios. This gives us a
baseline of how our work can deter both focus and spread DoS attacks in a UAN environment.
Second, we introduce the three previously described node behavior techniques to be used in
more advanced DoS scenarios. All simulations are run on Aqua-Sim Next Generation, an
NS-3 based event-driven UAN simulator [34].
The purpose of our first set of tests study the effectiveness of our standard attacker
restriction by solely using our detection and restriction algorithm. Since this is meant to
be more of a general test we review one and three attacker scenarios using either a focus
or spread DoS attack. In these simulations we examine traffic density while making the
assumption that increased network congestion depicts excess energy consumption. In this
first set of tests we run simulation for two hours each. Our topology is set up with a single
sink at the UAN surface and 14 nodes arranged in a tree-like depiction branching down and
outwards from the surface. We assume a fully connected network with all network nodes’
location static, excluding mobile attackers in certain simulations. The network spans a 12
x 10 km area with all nodes spaced evenly apart. For simplicity we use a two dimensional
space while a three dimensional area would have no effect on our algorithm in review. Each
UAN modem has a 360 bps data rate while interest and data packets are 320 bits and 1 kb
in size, respectively. We use broadcast MAC with reduced backoffs to minimize interference
on packet management and attacker restriction. Since we are adapting NDN characteristics,
we assume a user-generated traffic scheme in which only the sink and malicious node(s) are
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capable of creating interest packets. Additionally, we use a naming hierarchy consisting of
three unique naming categories (crab, shark, and whale). These categories are accompanied
by a version number to distinguish new or different data that resides on the data sources.
For example, an interest packet may contain a name that looks like /Underwater/Shark/vX,
where X represents an arbitrarily chosen number. If this interest packet originates from
the UAN sink then the version number will reside within the network, while if an attacker
generates the packet the X value will not. All data source nodes are located at the bottom
of the topology. For path name prefix matching we compare the interest category and all
known paths on the receiving node. At a data source we use an exact naming scheme, in
which the category and version number of the interest packet must match the data source’s
content before a data packet can be generated. All mobile attackers speed is randomly chosen
between 1 and 4 knots and changes periodically throughout the simulation.
The second set of tests is orchestrated to depict advanced DoS attacks. For this we imple-
ment and test our three node behavior techniques working alongside our original detection
and restriction algorithm. Two advanced DoS scenarios are examined, with the first being
max attacker mobility and the second being an inconsistent attack. In the first scenario, an
attacker will constantly move at a speed of 4 knots (2 m/s) while always remaining in range
of at least one non-data source node. This scenario takes advantage of our false positive
resets and consistently changes its point of attack through device mobility. The inconsis-
tent attacker scenario periodically starts and stops its DoS after a preset amount of time.
The goal of this attacker is to allow threshold resets to occur in our detection and restrict
algorithm making the attacker’s behavior seem normal. Additionally, we introduce three
basic topologies to assist in directly measuring node behavior techniques instead of appli-
cation specific trends. Information on these topologies can be seen in Table 4.1. For the
string topology with three naming categories the three data sources expand in a semi-star
61
shape. Each scenario also includes a single DoS attacker node. For all scenarios the sink and
data source(s) are at opposite sides of the topology. Additionally, all nodes, except for the
attacker, are evenly spaced out and static.
Table 4.1: Advanced DoS Topologies
Naming Category Nodes Layout Size (m)
Single Prefix 4 String 1600 x 10
Three Prefixes 6 String 2400 x 1600
Three Prefixes 10 Grid 2400 x 2400
Simulation runs, for these advanced scenario tests, last 200 minutes with the DoS attack
starting at 2500 seconds. In scenarios with more than one naming category, sinks and
attackers choose each interest packet’s naming prefix randomly. Similar to previous tests,
attacker generated interests will have a version number that is unique and does not reside
in the current UAN. Additionally, we use broadcast MAC for its limited interference on
network traffic. Sink nodes are set to generate interest packets at a rate of one packet every
22 seconds. Packet sizes are set to 320 bits and 1 kb for interest and data, respectively.
The thresholds for our DoS detection and restriction algorithm are set at the beginning of
simulation as follows: intTi=0.8, βTi=0.25, and δTi=0.25. Both thresholds for pushback and
throttle phases are small since a potential attacker will be competing with network generated
traffic. Therefore, we must make our thresholds more sensitive, with a low starting value,
to be able to detect malicious behavior. The attacker node is set to generate packets at a
rate of one packet every 40 seconds. In the max mobility scenarios the attacker will move
side to side for each string layout and in a circular pattern for the grid topology. Our preset
timer for inconsistent DoS attacks is set to five minutes. Therefore, each attack will follow
a five minutes on and five minutes off pattern. All UAN nodes retain information on active
and idle neighbors, allowing for pruning of unnecessary data if a malicious device is to move
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out-of-range. The DoS detection and restriction algorithm occurs every two minutes, while
each pushback or throttle sequence lasts for three minutes unless the phase reoccurs due to
a new detection.
To improve the accuracy of our implemented node behavior technique, it is essential to
find the optimal population size for each node behavior technique given our UAN topologies.
To accomplish this task we tested each advanced DoS attack topology with varying table
sizes, N , ranging from 5 to 140. Fig. 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 show the results of these varying
table sizes, in which the accuracy for each test is determined by the scoring outcome on
each node. Additionally, each behavior technique’s algorithm is executed once the current
table size meets or exceeds the current N value, followed by clearing all table entries. After
reviewing these results we choose to use table sizes 10, 10, and 100 for statistical, rules
mining, and SVM respectively. In regards to SVM, our model is retrained every time this
minimum table size is reached. Additionally, it is important to note that statistical and rules
mining models both suffered from reduced polling information as N value increased, leading
to less reliable accuracy.
4.5.2 Standard Attacker Restriction
In our standard DoS restriction we review three different metrics such that: no attack is
occurring, no algorithm is used during DoS, and DoS with restriction algorithm used. In
this way, we are able to contrast the effects of our DoS detection and restriction algorithm
alongside the increased traffic of an unrestricted attack. We first simulate a single attacker
using a focused attack in which the malicious device’s position is static in Fig. 4.7 and mobile
in Fig. 4.8. By comparing no DoS versus an unrestricted attack it is clear that network
traffic density greatly increases. While this conclusion is trivial it depicts the impact this
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Figure 4.4: Accuracy of each technique using varying table size, N , in a string topology with
one naming prefix.
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Figure 4.5: Accuracy of each technique using varying table size, N , in a string topology with
three naming prefixes.
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Figure 4.6: Accuracy of each technique using varying table size, N , in a grid topology with
three naming prefixes.
type of attack can have. Furthermore, we note that even with our detection and restriction
algorithm active there is a slight delay in any attacker restriction. In Fig. 4.9 we see a closer
view of this delay from a mobile focused DoS attack. This delay is related to each node’s
PIT timeouts and the three used thresholds; intTi, βTi, and δTi. While we could change
these thresholds to reduce this unrestricted period, it would increase the possibility of false
positives due to harsh environmental factors consequently dropping packets. In Fig. 4.10
and 4.11 we review a single malicious device performing a spread DoS attack with static
and mobile positioning, respectively. For a spread DoS the attacker arbitrarily chooses the
naming prefix when creating malicious interest packets. We assume that this attacker has
prior knowledge of the UAN in order to known the possible prefixes which reside on the
network. For example, a malicious device may be able to eavesdrop, prior to attacking, to
gather this information. It is also important to note that if a network node is to receive an
interest packet and does not have a known route for the given naming prefix it will instead
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Figure 4.7: Traffic density effects from a single static attacker performing a focused DoS attack.
drop the packet. For example, if an attacker were to be in range of the naming prefix for
sharks but creates an interest packet for crabs this injected packet will be ignored by the
UAN. Due to this logic and the starting position of the attacker, we see a slight drop in
overall traffic for spread DoS attacks, even in the case of no restriction algorithm being
implemented.
To increase the effect of a DoS attack on a UAN a malicious user may use multiple devices.
To simulate this we increased our tests by introducing three different attackers positioned in
our UAN. These attackers have identical characteristics to the ones previously mentioned.
In Fig. 4.12 and 4.13 we depict our results of three DoS attackers in static and mobile
focused attacker scenarios. All starting positions of attackers reside in range of the targeted
naming prefix path and therefore will not be ignored by our UAN. Additionally, in this
attack style all malicious devices use the same naming category in order to target a specific
region of our simulated UAN. Predictably, we see a large increase in network traffic for static
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Figure 4.8: Traffic density effects from a single mobile attacker performing a focused DoS attack.
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Figure 4.9: Section view of a mobile attacker using a focused DoS attack.
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Figure 4.10: Traffic density effects from a single static attacker performing a spread DoS attack.
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Figure 4.11: Traffic density effects from a single mobile attacker performing a spread DoS
attack.
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Figure 4.12: Traffic density effects from three static attackers performing a focused DoS attack.
and mobile nodes alike. Additionally, we see a similar restriction delay in the beginning of
each simulation as seen in single attacker scenarios. Fig. 4.14 and 4.15 show the results of
multiple static and mobile attackers carrying out a spread DoS attack, respectively. Even
with a greater amount of fake interest packets being generated we still see a large decrease
in traffic, which is directly related to the restriction of malicious packets. Furthermore, in
the spread attack results we see a limiting DoS effect even without detection and restriction
rules in place, depicting how unknown naming prefix paths can help restrict against this
type of attack.
4.5.3 Node Behavior Performance
In order to extend our testing we must apply our probabilistic, adaptive, and predictive tech-
niques to our various advanced DoS attacks. Our results are shown in Tables 4.2 through
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Figure 4.13: Traffic density effects from three mobile attackers performing a focused DoS attack.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Time (s)
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
N
et
w
or
k 
Tr
af
fic
 (b
its
)
No Attack No Algorithm Algorithm
Figure 4.14: Traffic density effects from three static attackers performing a spread DoS attack.
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Figure 4.15: Traffic density effects from three mobile attackers performing a spread DoS attack.
4.8. We break our finding down by recorded data in our varied tests. Unblocked Pkts denotes
how many unique DoS packet IDs are created and left unrestricted during the lifetime of
the simulation. For comparison purposes, we do not count the retransmission of the same
packet twice. To help show the consistency of our DoS detection and restriction algorithm
we included the number of times a pushback phase (Pb) or a throttle phase (T ) occurred.
Furthermore, we include the accuracy for each behavior technique, independently, and the
average of all three models. These accuracies review all node scoring reports versus occur-
rences of false negatives (FN ) and false positives (FP). The term false negative represents an
attacker who is declared as a 0, and a false positive is when a regular node is declared as a 1.
Additionally, for the rules mining model we used four rule sets as follows: mobility/βi/inti,
mobility/δi/inti, βi/inti, and δi/inti. Each rule set is managed independently and adapted
in Alg. 4.3, if necessary. To reduce computation complexity we used a linear SVM model
in our testing. This approach offers a trade off between prediction model accuracy and
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complexity, while more closely resembling the capability of a light-weight UAN modem.
Next, we review each advanced DoS scenario alongside the accuracy of each node be-
havior model implemented. For max mobility DoS we provide our simulation overview and
a more in-depth accuracy report in Tables 4.2 and 4.5, respectively. Overall we see an
average of 75% accuracy in this section. Furthermore, our statistical model has a higher
accuracy percentage due to the pessimistic approach of declaring all newly sensed neighbors
as possible attackers. In the case of highly mobile adversaries, this pessimistic viewpoint
plays a crucial role in declaring node behavior even if the malicious user consistently leaves
and reenters transmission range. Additionally, SVM seems to have a considerable amount
of false negatives, making us believe our current SVM model has difficulty training during
our simulation run. It may be beneficial to either train our model previously to an attack,
instead of throughout, or allow for larger training sets with additional indexes.
To extend upon our max mobility results we expanded our testing to a 24 hour simulation
as seen in Tables 4.3 and 4.6. The produced data shows similar accuracy results, albeit scaled,
with only a slight drop in accuracy. This drop is directly correlated with our rules mining
model which seems to have a large influx in false negatives and positives. In contrary, our
statistical approach seems to have improved accuracy over this extended test. This leads us
to believe that the pessimistic approach in classifying node behavior heavily assists in highly
mobile attacker scenarios.
We also review our three behavior techniques in detecting inconsistent DoS attacks, as
seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.7. Here we see a larger amount of pushback and throttle phase
resets, in comparison to max mobility scenarios. We believe this is directly correlated to the
purpose of the attack, in which a malicious device will become idle for an extended period
of time allowing for algorithm phase resets to occur. In this way, an attacker can try to
become more difficult to detect, since our standard detection and restriction algorithm will
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continuously mislabel this malicious device as a false positive. By implementing our behavior
analysis techniques we see a 75, 78, and 77 accuracy percentage for single name string, three
name string, and grid topologies, respectively. Due to the higher accuracy of our statistical
model we believe our pessimistic approach is well equipped to manage this DoS attack type.
Additionally, rules mining model shows less false positives resulting in less normal packets
being incorrectly classified.
Finally, we must review the overall improvements in implementing our DoS detection
and restriction algorithm and behavior techniques alike. To accomplish this we review how
many malicious packets are restricted in each of the advanced DoS scenarios. These results
are shown in Table 4.8 representing the number of restricted DoS packets alongside the
percentage restricted from each algorithm. Therefore, we are able to see exactly how large
of a percentile impact our proposals can have on detecting and restricting DoS attacks in
more advanced scenarios. For the Node Behavior category, we are reviewing the average
improvement of all three applied techniques. In the scenario of max mobility we see a large
improvement when applying node behavior techniques to our standard DoS detection algo-
rithm. Furthermore, in the majority of max mobility cases we see a 10% improvement, or
better, in restricting malicious packets. In contrast, we see an improvement in inconsistent
attacker restriction when adding node behavior techniques to our standard DoS detection al-
gorithm, albeit much smaller of an improvement. For either scenario this increased malicious
restriction leads to extended network lifespan due to less wasted transmissions throughout
our UAN.
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Table 4.5: Max mobility DoS attack model accuracy in-depth review.
Statistical (%) Rules Mining (%) SVM (%)
Overall FN FP Overall FN FP Overall FN FP
String(1 prefix) 78.57 14.29 7.14 71.43 11.9 16.67 75 25 0
String(3 prefix) 85.94 6.25 7.81 68.75 17.19 14.06 72.63 27.37 0
Grid 79.45 11.64 8.9 89.04 4.79 6.16 76.77 23.23 0
Table 4.6: 24 hour max mobility DoS attack model accuracy in-depth review.
Statistical (%) Rules Mining (%) SVM (%)
Overall FN FP Overall FN FP Overall FN FP
String(1 prefix) 78.61 20.48 0.9 49.4 32.53 18.07 65.9 13.5 20.6
String(3 prefix) 91.2 7.8 1 68.13 28.09 3.78 71.67 27.86 0.47
Grid 91.17 7.71 1.11 65.12 21.42 13.45 74.85 23.7 1.45
4.6 Discussion
By adjusting the frequency and retained information of our DoS detection and restriction
algorithm a user can adapt this work to fit their UAN application. Due to the destructive
nature of DoS attacks we believe that the costs to maintain a security system outweighs
the potential harm that could come from such an attack. Furthermore, by implementing
components of our proposed work we see, in many cases, the pre-throttling of various DoS
attacks. In the max mobility advanced DoS scenario the malicious user must consistently
move their position. We argue that this movement will quickly become an expensive factor
Table 4.7: Inconsistent DoS attack model accuracy in-depth review.
Statistical (%) Rules Mining (%) SVM (%)
Overall FN FP Overall FN FP Overall FN FP
String(1 prefix) 87.5 5 7.5 62.5 20 17.5 75.16 24.84 0
String(3 prefix) 91.8 8.2 0 72.13 19.67 8.2 70.8 29.2 0
Grid 91.8 8.2 0 72.13 19.67 8.2 70.8 29.2 0
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Table 4.8: Advanced scenarios malicious packet restriction.
Standard Node Behavior
Packets (%) Packets (%) Total(%)
Max Mobility: String(1 prefix) 403 45.95 95 10.83 56.78
String(3 prefix) 4939 77.95 270 4.26 82.21
Grid 47 3.77 332 26.62 30.39
Inconsistent: String(1 prefix) 208 44.44 45 9.62 54.06
String(3 prefix) 2952 87.6 40 1.19 88.79
Grid 38 5.73 10 1.51 7.24
in maintaining a continuous attack and force the attacker to either adjust their DoS or limit
its effect. Furthermore, if an attacker chooses to limit its attack, such as in the inconsistent
DoS scenario, the attack is, firstly, being self-restricted and, secondly, may be detected by
our node behavior analysis. Additionally, we argue that by consistently adjusting our phase
reset periods, during the lifespan of our UAN, we can reduce the likelihood of an inconsistent
DoS attack.
To gather a more rounded view of DoS attacks in UAN, we must also look at the worst
case scenario. For our work, this may be an attacker requesting all data which resides in
the network. Therefore, the characteristics of our UAN would resemble a typical sense and
push UAN structure, since all collected UAN information would be pushed towards the at-
tacker source. While this is not optimal, in terms of resource management, it does give us
a baseline which closely resembles how many current UANs manage collected information.
Furthermore, we assume a caching principle which would highly restrict or eliminate dupli-
cate requests, directly affecting this type of DoS attack. Additionally, this work could be
expanded to look more closely at node synchronization in deterring DoS efforts. Since com-
putational complexity may still be a concern for many UANs, we could instead try to offload
the complexity among multiple nodes. Additionally, this could limit our dependability on
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localization awareness in our proposed solution. Of course this would incur a slight increase
in network traffic, it still may serve beneficial characteristics in certain UAN applications.
Finally, we believe our node behavior and machine learning models would benefit from
future research by adjusting our current models to be more situational aware of DoS attacks.
This could result in heightened sensitivity to anomalies in node behavior and quicker detec-
tion response. Additionally, we could adapt different machine learning techniques that may
be better suited for UAN or provide more beneficial components than the three currently
analyzed.
4.7 Conclusion
In this work we introduce NDN related components to improve potential security threats
seen in UANs. By adapting NDN principles in naming content and routing strategies we
are more adept at restricting standard attacks and detecting abnormal node behavior. Fur-
thermore, we analyze the various types of DoS attacks that can be used to shorten UAN
lifespan or highly increase traffic density. To overcome this issue we develop a DoS detec-
tion and restriction algorithm which monitors network traffic and flags potential malicious
behavior. We use various thresholds to distinguish between attacker characteristics or harsh
environmental related false positives. If a DoS attack is detected, we introduce a pushback or
throttling phase dependent on the type of attack monitored. Simulation results are gathered
depicting single and multiple attackers in static and mobile scenarios. Our findings depict
strong capability to restrict against DoS attacks after a short detection period.
We also must analyze the introduction of more advanced DoS attacks seen in UANs. To
accomplish this we first discuss two attacker scenarios in which our proposed algorithm may
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be hindered. To compensate, we propose three different node behavior techniques which
take a probabilistic, adaptive, and predictive approach in detecting malicious activity. We
provide thorough discussion on our integration of these various machine learning techniques.
Furthermore, we present simulation results to depict the accuracy of these models in ad-
vanced DoS scenarios. Our findings show improved attacker restriction in these advanced
scenarios, while also providing decent detection accuracy. Furthermore, we discuss malicious
user implementations of these advanced attacks, potentially limiting their overall DoS effect
on a UAN. Additionally, we believe that further adjustment of our node behavior models
will lead to improved DoS detection and restriction.
Chapter 5
Underwater Simulation
5.1 Background
With the emergence of UANs as an effective means of aquatic applications, so has the neces-
sity to maintain a standardized simulation platform for ongoing network design, algorithm,
and protocol testing. To properly facilitate underwater research this platform must be able
to accurately depict underwater scenarios with a vast amount of tools and components for
users and developers alike. At the time of Aqua-Sim creation, there was no singular packet
level UAN available. Instead, there was NS-2, which supported terrestrial communication.
Therefore, NS-2 was capable of supporting the wireless means of UANs but lacked simulation
of underwater limitations and differential communication (in comparison to radio frequency).
And thus, the necessity for a UAN simulator was established. The first Aqua-Sim paper was
published in 2009 [33], accompanied by a beta version of the code openly available online and
shortly followed by a stable 1.0 version. To alleviate the difficulties of creating a stand-a-lone
simulation platform, Aqua-Sim was established on NS-2, as a specialized underwater pack-
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age. This allowed Aqua-Sim to grow independent of NS-2 and focus more on components
such as acoustic signal attenuation and packet collisions designed for underwater networks.
Since Aqua-Sim is implemented on NS-2, it advantageously integrates the various APIs and
packet handling components developed in NS-2. Additionally, components such as event
handling are managed by the NS-2 network platform allowing for Aqua-Sim to take a more
direct approach to properly simulating UAN protocol stack and its corresponding channels.
5.2 Related Work
Due to the popularity of UANs there exists a wide variety of different platforms supporting
underwater simulation. Many of these platforms are open source while some allow free usage
of their software with limited access to their source code. Furthermore, we see a range of
physical layer modeling (i.e. acoustic wave pattern modeling) versus full protocol stack mod-
els. Additionally, developers take different approaches to creating these UAN models such as
simulation, emulation, real-world code portability, and various aforementioned combinations.
There exists a multitude of different NS-2 based simulators specialized for UANs. In
SUNSET [100] and DESERT [101] we see a combination of simulator, emulator, and real-
system code frameworks. Both of these frameworks are open source, support a protocol stack
model, and were built on NS-2 with supporting libraries from NS-2-Miracle [102]. World
Ocean Simulation System (WOSS) [103] specializes in acoustic propagation simulation. Ad-
ditionally, WOSS can use experimental data to create channel simulated reproductions of
UANs. WOSS framework provides support for Bellhop [104], a sound propagation simulator
for ray tracing. In UNetStack [105] the authors created an underwater networking stack im-
plemented using Java and Groovy released in a closed source manner. UWSim [106] provides
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a 3D modeling software for virtual marine robotics research and development. AUVNetSim
[107] is a Python based acoustic networking simulator for algorithm testing. In USNet [108]
we see an underwater sensor simulator created in C++ for real-time processing and 3D vi-
sualization. Aqua-Glomo [109] is a packet extension for underwater physical and network
layer simulation that runs on GloMoSim [110]. UAN [111] is the current underwater module
supported on NS-3. While the UAN module does provide the various components seen in
UANs, it is limited to four MAC layer protocols and does not support underwater routing
layer components. Additionally, the module lacks support for additional UAN features such
as synchronization and localization support. We found UANs’ limited support in MAC and
routing layers to fall short of Aqua-Sim’s architecture, and instead it was more effective
to transition Aqua-Sim to NS-3 as a stand-a-lone module that can expand with additional
features and protocols.
5.3 Challenges
NS-2 was released in 1996 as an open source network simulator. Over this software’s long
lifespan, we have seen a large usage of extended modules and support representing NS-2’s
broad reaching acceptance. Due to development age of this framework, core ideas and struc-
tures lack beneficial components due to the computing power and coding design available at
release. For example, NS-2 is designed using C++ as its core module language with OTcl
used for scripting. In part, this development decision was made to decrease recompiling time
of user scripts while inherently creating disadvantages by using two different programming
languages. One of the main shortfalls of this multi language framework is properly managing
debugging for both C++ and OTcl. Other OTcl related limitations exist such as overhead
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in the case of network scalability. Furthermore, performance restrictions in NS-2 include
packet header management. All headers currently in use will be allocated to each packet in
the NS-2 simulation even if the specific packet has no use for a given header. We also see
user and developer related limitations in NS-2. While C++ does offer memory management
components, NS-2 does not provide a streamlined means of memory handling, which in-
stead places the task on the developer. Therefore, if memory is mismanaged this issue could
quickly lead to poor performance. Additionally, extensive learning is required to establish
an understanding of NS-2 and run proper tests [112]. This is due to the convoluted sections
of NS-2’s core simulator in comparison to other similar frameworks.
To improve some of the aforementioned limitations of NS-2 and further expand net-
work simulators, NS-3 was created. This simulator was first released in 2008 and featured
a completely revamped architecture to meet new research needs. While NS-3 was created
to alleviate the shortcomings of NS-2, it originally lacked credibility due to its youthful
development state [113]. From this initial release, NS-3 has seen continuous versions with
expansive package support. Various work and discussions have been made comparing NS-2
and NS-3 [114–116]. To eliminate the disadvantages of OTcl, NS-3 was implemented entirely
in C++ language. For extendability purposes, NS-3 also supports Python for scripting and
visualization, but is not required in order to properly execute. For performance gains, NS-3
introduced single buffer packet header management. This results in each packet maintain-
ing only necessary headers. Additionally, NS-3’s core was revamped to improve simulation
scalability and overall functionality. Within NS-3’s API, new features are introduced such
as smart pointers and tracers. While C++ offers proper pointer deallocation tools, NS-3
provides inherited smart pointer encapsulation to shift the strain of memory management to
the simulator. These smart pointers function by automatically de-allocating objects, using a
reference counting scheme. By advantageously using these memory management components
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users and developers can ensure better performance across all created protocols. Through
the integration of tracers, NS-3 also introduces new ways to capture simulation data with-
out excessive recompilations. NS-3 also offers simulation extendability in the form of Direct
Code Execution (DCE). Through the use of DCE a user can apply their protocol testing
within a controlled testbed environment without major source code changes.
After reviewing the many improvements available on NS-3 we chose to transition Aqua-
Sim to this framework. The process to do this constituted a complete revamp of our original
Aqua-Sim architecture while also providing the opportunity to clean up previous code and
add additional features to our UAN simulator. This revamped and expanded underwater
simulator is named Aqua-Sim Next Generation (Aqua-Sim NG). For clarity, future references
of Aqua-Sim will relate to the previous 1.0 version while references to the current architecture
will be declared as Aqua-Sim NG.
5.4 Architecture Revamp
5.4.1 Structure and Code Flow
Although NS-3 strives to maintain an ever-expanding open software for researchers, it is
unfortunately not backwards-compatible. Therefore, NS-2’s API is not fully supported on
NS-3 resulting in Aqua-Sim requiring a complete restructure in order to shift to the NS-3
simulator. In many cases, this restructure of Aqua-Sim consists of rewriting functions and
classes within all files of the underwater module. Additionally, this transition provides the
opportunity to clean up code and decrease redundancy which has accumulated from the
collaborative efforts of many developers over years of work.
To conform to the newly acquired API of NS-3, we had to completely recode large sections
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of the Aqua-Sim architecture. Certain components like event scheduling had to be rewritten
to satisfy parameter and proper access requirements. We also took advantage of NS-3’s smart
pointers template when reviewing or creating class and function pointers. In this way, we
are able to properly use reference counting for simpler memory allocation and deallocation.
The introduction of smart pointers is a crucial step in removing memory leaks which severely
affected past work in Aqua-Sim. Another example of an integrated component in Aqua-Sim
NG is the NS-3’s Timer class. Here we were able to implement and inherit standard timer
functionality instead of redundantly creating our own timer components as seen in Aqua-
Sim. Furthermore, with newer versions of NS-3 we see support for C++-11, due to enhanced
compiler support, allowing for further capability with the C++ language.
Beyond the various API changes, we also consolidated large sections of Aqua-Sim’s code
to reduce redundancy caused by the vast user input over the simulation’s lifespan. For ex-
ample, we condensed the Sink and Node class into a single AquaSimNetDevice class, which
serves the purpose of either a regular node or a sink. Therefore, a user can decide each
device’s purpose, during simulation, without having to redeclare the class and any affiliated
parameters. Additionally, our AquaSimNetDevice is a child class of NS-3’s NetDevice pro-
viding inherited features. We consolidated the redundancy seen on different layers of our
simulator, such as various delay calculating functions that essentially were computing the
same thing. During this structure revamp of Aqua-Sim to NS-3 we came across a major issue
of cross-module calls, assignments, and declarations. To overcome this circular dependency
hurdle we transitioned our architecture layout to revolve around our net device, essentially
allowing the AquaSimNetDevice class to manage connectivity better within layers and shared
features. For example, if a specific routing protocol is interested in the modem’s address, we
can directly ask the net device. This provides our Aqua-Sim NG structure to create a more
coherent modularity scheme without acquiring inclusion loops within our code.
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NS-3 architecture establishes a strong correlation between base and child classes, and
strongly encourages this inheritance scheme in all modules. This approach allows for modules
to have more specialization among their child classes while ensuring basic functionality among
the base (parent) class. We develop this strategy for each layer of Aqua-Sim NG. For example,
in the MAC layer, we have a base class (AquaSimMac) which handles packet transitions to
other layers, transmission time calculations, and modem power management, to name a
few. Therefore, we can introduce more specific protocols that inherit these features and
uniquely interact with network and packet components. To ensure proper functionality we
also incorporate pure virtual functions, which by definition, force a child class to override
the specified function(s). For example, on the routing and MAC layers we implement the
packet receiving and transmitting process as pure virtual functions. Therefore, each newly
designed child protocol, in either of these layers, must specify how it will process incoming
and outgoing packets in regards to their protocol.
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In Fig. 5.1, we show a representation of the Aqua-Sim NG architecture. Each layer
contains children classes which interact with their associated base class. We centralize our
structure around the AquaSimNetDevice, which is positioned on the implemented Aqua-Sim
channel. This approach allows for a customizable central hub to allow users to adapt their
simulation and support modularity within each layer of our architecture. New protocols and
layer specific features can easily be integrated due to this layout. We also offer additional
modules alongside the standard MAC layer, which can be implemented in our packet flow
sequence based on the packet types created. Thus, we may see synchronization or localization
packets in addition to our typical MAC layer packets within the same simulation. This
diversity is managed by a packet type demux on the physical layer. In regards to this
demux, we also provide two other stand-a-lone modules which are specialized for UANs,
namely, NDN and Attacker. The purpose of NDN, in this layer, is to allow for specialized
packets that are adapted to underwater limitations that can be easily simulated and evolved
independently of Aqua-Sim NG. Additionally, we provide an attacker module which allows
for simpler malicious device integration in simulation testing. Consequently, by supporting
this attacker module within our architecture, we eliminate the necessity to create a dedicated
net device class for simulating an attacker. Instead a developer or user can create a device
with similar components to a standard UAN modem while using this attacker module to
adjust the malicious behavior of the device.
For Aqua-Sim NG, we continue to support the same attenuation model, as used in Aqua-
Sim, which is adopted from [117]. This model is shown in Eq. 5.1.
A(l, f) = lk × (10α(f)10 )l (5.1)
Where l is distance at frequency f and k is the spread factor determined by the acoustic
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signal’s spreading type. Such that spreading is set to 1 for cylindrical, 1.5 for practical and
2 for spherical. α(f) represents the absorption coefficient which uses Thorp’s approximation
equation from [117] as seen in Eq. 5.2.
α(f) =
0.11× f 2
1 + f 2
+
44× f 2
4100 + f 2
+ 2.75× 10−4 × f 2 + 0.003 (5.2)
With kHz represented as f .
5.4.2 User Integration
Due to the vast differences between NS-2 and NS-3 architecture, we had to completely rewrite
Aqua-Sim’s OTcl scripts in order for them to function properly in Aqua-Sim NG. These
newly created scripts had to be rewritten in C++ and redesigned to accommodate Aqua-
Sim NG’s new architecture. Additionally, these scripts needed to populate the simulation
with whatever protocols and parameters are currently being tested. To remove redundancy
and assist the user in this region, we also integrated helper scripts. These helpers contain
various functions which make the creation of network layers, assigning protocol settings,
and generating devices easier and more streamlined. Additionally, they create the required
objects and assign them to their associated pointers to ensure no null pointers exist during
runtime. For example, in the AquaSimHelper class we designed a Create function, which,
as the name depicts, creates and populates a new Aqua-Sim net device. Additionally, we
provided an overloaded function of Create which can create a batch of net devices instead of
a singular component. Furthermore, new test scripts were created to assist in testing various
aspects and protocols of our code to ensure accuracy in the underwater module.
To further enhance functionality of Aqua-Sim NG we integrated better tracer and call-
back support. These newly acquired functionalities are expanded from the NS-3 provided
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API. The purpose is to assist in creating more structured data output and debugging logs.
To accomplish this task we integrated usage of tracers in each layer, alongside helper com-
ponents that create ASCII output. These outputs are dependent on the user or developer’s
preferences and can be directly adjusted in the helper script. Additionally, we incorporate
NS-3’s logging tool for specialized logger output. Based on this tool, a user can specify
class and severity of logged information. For example, if the user wants a particular warning
message when a certain event occurs, they can label the logging message with LOG WARN.
Additionally, the user could specify only the AquaSimChannel class for logging output to
further analyze the behavior of this code section or for debugging purposes.
5.5 Protocol Port
To accommodate the architecture revamp using a strong inheritance model, we had to re-
design the MAC and routing layer components. Through the creation of base classes we are
able to manage packet flow, tracing components, and layer specific common functionality.
Within each protocol layer, child classes are meant to independently handle packets and ad-
here to their protocol definition. Therefore, new protocols can easily be added to the MAC
and routing layer without needing to adjust how our base layers handle packets due to this
modularity approach. Additionally, this inheritance relationship adds a simpler debugging
approach since we can reuse base layer and protocol specific tracing and logging components.
Due to the single buffer characteristic of our packet headers it is critical that we prop-
erly manage header editions. This required unique classification of each header class and
its associated features for each protocol. More importantly, this step required close protocol
examination of proper buffer management to ensure correct reading of header bytes. For ex-
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ample, if a transmitting packet has two header fields, we must be certain that the receiving
node decodes these separate headers in the proper single buffer order. Many issues arose dur-
ing this step of Aqua-Sim NG creation due to the various protocol interpretations and coding
styles used in Aqua-Sim. Thus, this lead to many areas of Aqua-Sim’s protocols requiring
restructuring and thorough debugging. One major issue we came across was properly man-
aging expected packet headers during transmission and receiving stages. More importantly,
this hurdle required each layer to manage packet headers independently of the protocols
currently in use. If left unchecked, this issue can quickly lead to out-of-bound memory reads
of the single buffer header space. Or worse, this bug can go undetected and instead lead to
illegal header ordering consequently giving unexpected values and false results. Instead we
approached this problem with the idea of modularizing the usage of headers for each layer
and, therefore, encapsulating multiple headers within each packet. While this technique is
implemented based on previous Aqua-Sim simulation we believe this entire system requires
an overhaul to make it more adaptive, reduce header redundancy, and overall more realistic.
Thus, we place this idea within our future works category for further improving the overall
Aqua-Sim NG simulator. Aqua-Sim protocols also had to undergo more trivial transitions
during this phase of Aqua-Sim NG creation. Such modifications like rewording variables and
functions to fit the coding styles of NS-3 were required without breaking predefined code.
We also had to ensure legacy support for previous protocol components such as mobility
model usage for vector calculations.
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5.6 Real-World Features
Aqua-Sim was created as a framework for cost efficient and accurate UAN testing. For
many researchers, locality to large water sources and necessary equipment may not be read-
ily available requiring alternative means to test proposed work. Additionally, Aqua-Sim was
constructed as a way to mirror underwater conditions, as close as possible, for the researching
community. The goal of Aqua-Sim NG is to continue this claim by improving the simulator
with newly found ideas and logical features. This is meant to close the gap between under-
water field tests and simulation runs while providing a broad range of supported protocols
for new and experienced Aqua-Sim NG users.
5.6.1 Localization and Synchronization Support
Many TWN MAC and routing layer protocols rely on localization as a means of optimizing
channel utilization. By knowing coordinates of network nodes we can calculate potential
issues in our network such as introducing collision avoidance and channel fairness techniques.
Typically, TWNs use GPS as a cost efficient and reliable localization means. For UANs this
and other localization schemes are ineffective due to the restricted usage of radio waves [2, 4].
Instead we utilize the properties of acoustic attenuation and known anchor node locations.
Furthermore, we must account for other underwater factors such as high mobility among
UANs. For Aqua-Sim NG we approach this feature with a similar base and child class
methodology, as seen in other parts of the simulator’s architecture. The base localization
class contains components such as angle of arrival, Euclidean distance for both two- and
three-dimensional space, location error, and location list management. We also implement
a range-based localization scheme adapted from [118]. In this work, a node uses confidence
ratings determined by overhearing a set amount of neighboring node’s estimated location,
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and then estimating its own position. Our localization model allows for MAC or routing
layers to incorporate localizing techniques in their protocol without having to write these
components from scratch or mask them within their packets. Instead a developer or user
can choose to create localization packets, using a specialized type flag, within their protocol
and the physical layer’s demux will assist in differentiating packets on receiving devices.
Synchronization among network nodes is another important factor in many protocols as
seen in TWNs. For example, a protocol may be optimizing a shared medium by using time-
division multiple access technique, in which we will want to ensure that each node’s internal
clock is synchronized to avoid collisions. Typically, TWNs will take a similar approach to
localization by utilizing external commonality resources, such as GPS, to sync all devices.
In UANs this approach is again ineffective and requires unique solutions [119]. Additionally,
we see new challenges arise in UANs such as slower transmission rates, less reliable commu-
nication channels, and limited modem resources. To support synchronization in Aqua-Sim
NG we implemented a base class which contains beneficial functions such as clock skew man-
agement, specialized synchronization packets, and clock readjustments. Since NS-3 relies on
the simulator clock for scheduling purposes, our synchronization model instead manages an
internal clock that can increment clock skew. Similar to the localization model, our physical
layer’s demux distinguishes between synchronization and MAC packet types allowing them
to be simultaneously used within the same simulation.
5.6.2 Physical Layer Support
To further expand the capability of Aqua-Sim NG, we extensively expanded functionality
in the physical layer. This required restructuring packet handling between the channel and
physical layers. Dependent on the propagation model in use and network topology, certain
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or all nodes will receive transmitted packets after a given transmission delay. This delay is
dependent on the current attenuation model in use by the Aqua-Sim channel. While some
or all propagation models will receive the associated packet, not all may be able to decode
it. Due to factors such as external noise, packet collisions, or busy modem’s state we may
see packet errors arise during receiving. Aqua-Sim NG implements two main components
to assist in decoding packets: signal cache and Signal to Interference Noise Ratio (SINR)
checker. The signal cache keeps track of all incoming packets in a centralized linked list.
Furthermore, we examine each smart pointer within this list to figure out if this packet can
be properly decoded before passing it back to the physical layer. The SINR checker assists
the signal cache by providing a preset decodable threshold. For instance, if the current
channel noise is too high, then our packet decoding will fail, and we will drop the packet on
the given node.
Technologies in UANs are consistently improving and expanding, resulting in many
testbeds adding new and updated modems or other devices over time. To compensate,
Aqua-Sim NG must be able to handle various types of modems being tested within the same
network. Additionally, we must allow the capability for modems to switch between different
modulations. For example, if the hardware within a UAN modem allows for variations in
bandwidth or energy efficiency, by switching between data rates, we must be able to simu-
late this. Therefore, we have implemented devices to have one or multiple modulations that
can be actively switched dependent on current testing or user preferences. Additionally, we
ensured continuous support for previous modulation versions within Aqua-Sim NG.
Since UANs are consistently undergoing extensive research, previously accepted notions
may be changed over time. This is important when comparing the half duplex and high
transmission delay features of UANs to standard TWNs. More directly, we must revisit our
previous assumptions for TWNs when reviewing UAN MAC protocols. In [120] we see one
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of these problems, named busy terminal problem. This work targets the MAC layer protocol
assumption that packet transmissions can systematically be interrupted by another node
to improve channel utilization. In other words, an UAN device can not interrupt itself or
another device during transmitting or receiving due to the half duplex nature of acoustic
communication. In TWNs this is typically not a problem since transmission delays can be
seen a negligible. In regards to UAN modems, this problem is more apparent in transmissions
being overheard through the shared acoustic medium, requiring the overhearing modem to
be labeled as busy. To incorporate busy terminal problem’s solution in Aqua-Sim NG we
implemented a busy terminal queue for all outgoing packets. Located at the base class of the
MAC layer, this queue checks the current modem’s state when preparing to send an outgoing
packet and helps manage modem state when necessary. If the device’s modem is in the busy,
sending, or receiving state, we will place the outgoing packet in the busy terminal queue.
We take a first-in first-out approach for this queue to properly maintain sending order. Once
the modem transitions to the idle state, we check the busy terminal queue for any remaining
packets and handle them accordingly until the queue is empty.
5.6.3 Channel Related Support
To further enhance our underwater channel module we incorporate four new components
in Aqua-Sim NG. These additions include multi-channel simulation support, differentiated
noise generator classes, new and expanded propagation models, and real-world channel trace
support. By implementing these enhancements we improve the capability for users through
providing additional features and increasing the potential realism of Aqua-Sim NG.
Due to the vast nature and size of underwater environments it is important to have the
ability to fluctuate simulation conditions during runtime. For instance, an UAN can span
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across multiple kilometers resulting in channel dependent conditions on node communication
and locality. We incorporate support for multi-channels to meet these simulation require-
ments. By allowing for multiple channels within a single underwater simulation a user can
incorporate various propagation models and noise generators consequently affecting reliabil-
ity of acoustic transmissions. Additionally, this reinforces the usage of mobile nodes since
Aqua-Sim NG can adapt the channel conditions based on the current coordinates of a node,
broadening our simulator to newer devices such as AUVs.
Since UANs are highly dependent on acoustic communication, we see noise generators
as an essential part of properly simulating underwater conditions. Additionally, [23] shows
the extensive effect these external noises can have on properly receiving transmissions. We
see sources such as marine life, weather, human created, and malicious nodes taking part
in increased channel noise of various frequencies. To help replicate these system noises, we
implement a base noise generator class and child classes in Aqua-Sim NG. Firstly, we create
a generic noise generator in our base class which computes the given noise in decibels. This
model is based on Urick’s equation for acoustic noise [121], which adaptively uses water
turbulence, wind, shipping, and temperature external noises to construct the current total
noise on the underwater channel. Our first child class uses a constant noise generator,
therefore taking a simple approach to channel noise. Next we use a random noise generator,
allowing for users to set minimum and maximum values for expected noises. Finally, we
introduce a periodic noise generator class, which provides noise generation that is associated
with a given period of time. Therefore, a user can set fluctuating channel noise to closely
mimic marine life or boating acoustic interference. Additionally, we could manipulate this
feature to simulate jamming attacks, in which a malicious host injects external noise to fully
utilize underwater channels. Thus, our noise generators can assist in simulating one of the
many challenges seen in UANs.
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Previous iterations of Aqua-Sim supported two different propagation range models, namely,
transmission power based and max range based. For transmission power the provided prop-
agation model used Rayleigh attenuation model to figure out the farthest distance a wave-
length could travel. Where the max range uses a static range variable to determine which
nodes are in receiving range of the transmitter. A potential downfall in either of these
models is the assumption of a consistent 1500 m/s acoustic transmission speed independent
of current water conditions. Although acoustic communication is commonly listed at this
static speed, various past works have shown that the acoustic speed in ocean water may vary
[122]. Instead we incorporate an adaptive ranged based propagation model which varies
its acoustic speed based on [123]. This acoustic speed equation uses modem depth, water
salinity, and temperature to give a more accurate meters per second speed. Additionally,
this model continues to calculate attenuation using the Rayleigh model, allowing for only
nodes in range to receive a copy of the transmitted packet. Furthermore, we added Urick’s
Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR) model given in [121]. This SNR model is summarized in Eq.
5.3. In which TSL depicts the source’s transmitting power level, TL is the transmission loss
between sender and receiver, and NL is the channel’s total noise.
SNR = TSL− TL−NL (5.3)
To expand the adaptability of our channel conditions, in comparison to real-world recorded
information, we integrated a trace driven class. In this feature, a user can import real-world
recorded channel conditions and run simulations without redundantly implementing these
conditions by hand. Furthermore, this allows users to test different protocols while using
controlled, real-system channel variables. Thus, a user may introduce captured conditions
such as varying marine life noises or fluctuating temperatures and keep these varied condi-
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tions consistent between tests. Currently, this driver supports channel temperature, salinity,
and noise associated with a given timestamp. It is important to note that this class can be
expanded to accommodate differentiating channel requirements which apply to Aqua-Sim
NG.
5.6.4 Security Support
With the expansion of UANs, so comes the concern for users to exploit possible network
vulnerabilities. Due to the vast differences between TWNs and UANs, many of the typi-
cal security solutions, such as incorporating GPS support, may not work. To continuously
improve testing in Aqua-Sim NG, we must ensure the ability for users to easily integrate
attackers within their scenarios. To accomplish this we incorporate an attacker module inte-
grated within each net device. Therefore, a device can acquire these malicious characteristics
by setting a flag within the device. Furthermore, this allows nodes to behave maliciously
while still using some of the basic features of Aqua-Sim NG, such as the physical layer,
without redundantly creating a new attacker net device class. Our current attacker module
design consists of the following classes: base class, Denial of Service (DoS), sinkhole, selec-
tive forwarding, and Sybil attacker. While channel noise jamming is a major security threat
within UANs, we assume the implemented noise generator class within the channel layer can
mimic this feature.
The base attacker class provides packet handling and pointer deallocation tools similar
to what is seen in the MAC and routing layers of Aqua-Sim NG. Each child class models
a different malicious scenario seen in UAN. While these provided classes do not encompass
all potential attacks, they do provide an expandable developer avenue for simulating UAN
vulnerabilities. The DoS class replicates a malicious UAN packet flooding approach. In
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this case, a malicious node will send out a meaningless packet based on the given sending
frequency, with the goal of overwhelming either a set destination or the entire network.
While this attack may not completely cut off channel utility, it can create large traffic delays
or consume energy due to excessive transmissions. The sinkhole attack is characterized as
an attacker who draws traffic to itself through broadcasting attractive node characteristics,
such as high-quality routing or location. Once packets are broadcast towards this node,
the attacker will drop some or all packets dependent on the user-defined features. Selective
forwarding is similar to a sinkhole attack, in which an attacker chooses to drop some or all
packets. Additionally, this type of malicious node can behave more like a regular node, while
blocking certain packets based on their header components. An example of this could be
setting the attacker to drop 50 percent of all received packets from a specific node within
the UAN. Lastly, we implement a Sybil attacker class, which is meant to spoof its location
or identity. This type of behavior can be extended to allow an attacker to assume the role
of multiple locations within the network.
5.7 NDN Support
By offering the ability for new and innovative techniques in Aqua-Sim NG, we can support
broadening UAN technologies and protocols. With concepts like ICN we see potential new
avenues of research and solutions to the ongoing problems in UANs. To accomplish this task,
we incorporate an NDN module with various architectural features and specialized packet
management. While NS-3 supports an NDN module, ndnSim, as seen in [66, 67] there
are several downfalls in regards to UANs. First, this work was constructed for simulating
terrestrial networks, making the many assumptions and integrated protocols inadequate for
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underwater use. Second, this work typically assumes a wired connection between nodes,
which again falls short of the acoustic broadcasts which are used in UANs. Finally, with
the sheer size of ndnSim codebase it is more realistic to create an adapted version of NDN
within Aqua-Sim NG instead of integrating and adapting various ndnSim components and
APIs to meet our constraints.
We offer NDN support as a side module within our Aqua-Sim NG architecture. Therefore,
these set of classes can expand in independent parallelism alongside the currently supported
MAC and routing layers. To accomplish this distinction, we use our packet demux at our
physical layer to separate NDN and standard IP packets. Thus, we do not have to completely
revamp our simulator’s architecture while allowing for protocols to use various packet types
in the same simulation. This concurrent usage of NDN can provide beneficial avenues of
protocol and research improvements for the UAN community. Our adapted NDN module
offers four main components: CS, FIB, PIT, and quality of life features. The CS provides
in-network caching for increased transmission robustness and decreased cached data recovery
time. The PIT and FIB offer advancements in unique information-centric routing strategies.
Additionally, any of these components within the NDN module can beneficially use the
physical and channel layers of Aqua-Sim NG while evolving freely.
In NDN, we see the terminology of CS used to assist in faster and more efficient data
delivery to the end user. This is due to caching information within a node’s CS to adapt
to highly mobile nodes, reduce necessary transmissions for multiple identical data requests,
and increase redundancy in error prone channels. To assist in simulating our cache, we
implemented four different caching strategies: least recently used (LRU), first in first out
(FIFO), random, and no cache. In LRU, we implemented a typical item list which keeps
track of how frequent each cache entry is used. If our local storage is full, we proceed in
removing the back of our cache list, or least used item, to simulate this caching strategy.
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In FIFO, we remove the oldest entry added to the storage if the cache is full. To acquire
this entry we use a deque to simulate a line based cache. We choose this structure type to
assist in faster entry searching while also providing simple addition and removal of entries.
In random access, we randomly select and remove a given entry if the cache is full. To
reduce computational time, we use an unordered map structure to contain this cache storage.
Additionally, this reduces simulation complexity with frequent entry inserts, removals, and
searches. And lastly, we have no cache CS type. This category is meant to allow a user to
test other aspects of NDN without assuming additional resource burdens from implementing
node storages. Furthermore, the use of CSs may be unnecessary in smaller networks with
capability to connect with larger resource available networks. An example of this could be an
UAN sink communicating, via radio frequency, to coastal towers or satellites, with relatively
low bit error rates given its channel conditions. Since, in this example, off-site resources are
not as constrained and presumably easier to connect with, this would eliminate the need to
store data locally on an UAN and therefore make it pointless to simulate.
To properly handle information routing strategies, FIB use known data paths to assist
in forwarding interest packets towards related data. For instance, this may entail sending
interests towards the sea floor nodes, in which data is locally sensed and stored. To fully
implement this forwarding strategy, we introduce two difference schemes for simulation pur-
poses. The first being best route, which uses a routing cost-based approach to find the next
best receiver towards the interest in query. The second scheme is multicast, which takes all
potential forwarding neighbors, in the node’s FIB, and labels them as the interest packet’s
next hop receiver(s). Our implemented PIT behaves similar to typical NDN techniques but
is specialized to handle wireless communications. In this way, we can make the assumption
that routing loops are negligible since future PIT entries of the same interest will not be for-
warded by using conventional NDN techniques. Furthermore, we handle packet multicasting
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by adjusting the next hop node to contain one or multiple interest requesters.
And finally, for this NDN module we incorporate quality of life features to ease the
implementation and usage for Aqua-Sim NG users. The first component of this is the NDN
driver, which provides connection with AquaSimNetDevice and other core classes as well
as standard NDN packet creation. Also, this driver offers packet payload manipulation for
simplified data and interest buffer extraction. We also implement a name discovery class,
meant to assist in populating FIB tables. This allows users to create and send packets
with name prefixes dependent on the current CSs stored information, therefore simulating
new data paths. Additionally, we introduce specialized packet headers for interest and data
packets to assist in protocol handling and packet analysis. NDN related traffic generator
application and helper classes are also provided to assist users in creating and testing different
protocols within an information-centric underwater simulation.
5.8 Extensive Documentation
Aqua-Sim was first established as an open-source UAN simulator with community support
in mind. This allows for community incite on simulator bugs, features, and new protocols.
To assist in this open-source ideology we must ensure extensive documentation of all aspects
of our simulator.
We continue the goal of keeping Aqua-Sim NG open-source by providing all source code
and documentation to be openly available on its GitHub repository. Additionally, we supply
multiple forms of documentation to assist in the learning curve associated with becoming
accustomed to a new simulator. Our documentation covers topics in the following areas:
installation and simulator overview, protocol design and creation, script walk through, ar-
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chitecture diagram, and packet flow diagram. In the installation and simulator overview
guide, we provide the necessary instructions for installing Aqua-Sim NG within NS-3 along-
side example configuration set up. Furthermore, we discuss some of the overview areas of
Aqua-Sim NG such as logging, packet handling, and packet headers. In our protocol creation
guide, we review the various areas necessary for a newly created protocol within the MAC
or routing layer. Within the protocol itself we discuss topics such as base class interaction,
header buffer management, logging API usage, smart pointer integration, event scheduling,
object inherited components, and coding style. External of the protocol itself, we also dis-
cuss header class creation and header field management that can be specialized around the
protocol in development. In the example script walk through, we review the broadcast MAC
example seen in Aqua-Sim NG. In this documentation we step through each component in
the example script and discuss the importance of each line. We cover topics such as topol-
ogy and protocol stack creation, variable assignments, protocol specific adjustments, traffic
generator usage, socket assignment, and simulation execution.
To allow users and developers to more easily visualize how packets are typically managed
in each protocol layer of Aqua-Sim NG, we incorporate a packet flow diagram. The overview
version of this diagram is shown in Fig. 5.2. A more function specific packet flow diagram
is located on Aqua-Sim NG’s GitHub repository. Our packet flow diagram shows the basic
transition from a sender node to a receiver, and how each class is associated. For simplicity
purposes, we do not show unique child classes since each implemented protocol may manage
a packet differently. It is important to note that while protocol selection may affect the
packet flow on a granularity scale, due to Aqua-Sim NG’s modularity it is not necessary to
depict each protocol separately.
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Figure 5.2: An overview of the typical packet flow in Aqua-Sim NG.
5.9 Results
To ensure accuracy of any simulator, there must be tests and comparisons to other simula-
tors and real testbed results. Without proper comparison results, we have no way to verify
that a simulator’s output is relatively accurate. Instead a user or developer will require
further testing in a test bed scenario, fundamentally defeating the purpose of using a simu-
lator. Instead it is more reasonable to test simulator accuracy depicting the reliability of the
framework. For Aqua-Sim NG this consists of comparing various protocols to Aqua-Sim 1.0,
and comparing test bed results to our simulation’s output. Furthermore, we must review
the performance gains acquired from transitioning to NS-3.
Aqua-Sim NG has been an ongoing project since 2015. Work on this project has been
completed by myself as the sole developer and contributor from start to finish. As of Aqua-
Sim NG’s 1.0 release, on September 1st, 2017, the total repository contributions include 189
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commits, 72,476 additions, and 36,089 deletions. Also important to note that stats where
gathered from GitHub and only represent information after the simulator was uploaded.
Therefore, there were additional changes made to Aqua-Sim NG prior to creating a repos-
itory on this open-source site. Aqua-Sim NG’s GitHub repository can be found at [34].
Furthermore, a monthly representation of contributions to this simulator can be found in
Fig. 5.3. Here we show the total lines of code for additions and deletions according to each
month’s statistics. Each major peak represents additional protocol integration, modular or
feature additions, and redundancy removals.
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Simulation results for Aqua-Sim NG were collected using release v1.0 collected on an
Intel Core i7 computer with 16 GiB of memory. This computer is running Ubuntu 16.04
OS with gcc-4.8.5 to accommodate C++-11 features. Furthermore, we used valgrind [124],
version 3.11.0, and linux’s time system call to assist in collecting results. Within the valgrind
tool set we use the memory leakage detection as well as the massif tool for heap profiling. To
evaluate the improvements made to Aqua-Sim NG, we review the following three categories:
memory performance, scalability, and accuracy.
To reflect with our collected results, we compare Aqua-Sim NG with Aqua-Sim (version
1.0) and SUNSET. We use four different UAN based MAC and routing protocol sets as
follows: ALOHA [125] with static routing, broadcast MAC with static routing, FAMA [126]
with static routing, and broadcast MAC with VBF [127]. These protocols were chosen based
on their prior support on each simulator as well as their simplicity, allowing for more direct
framework analysis. We assume a fully connected network with all nodes having a static
location. Furthermore, unless stated otherwise, each test is completed using ten nodes and
a single sink set in a string topology. While these results are not protocol straining, they do
allow us to review how each UAN simulator manages performance.
5.9.1 Memory Management
One of the major benefits of transitioning Aqua-Sim to NS-3 core simulator was the API in-
tegrated memory management. By using NS-3’s provided smart pointers we make it common
practice, in Aqua-Sim NG, to wrap all eligible pointers in this memory reference counting
API. Therefore, stepping away from the developer dependent strain of properly managing
memory allocation as seen in previous versions of Aqua-Sim. In Fig. 5.4 we review an ex-
ample of this limitation as seen in Aqua-Sim. Independent of the simulator’s run time, we
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see millions of leaked bytes, consequently reducing simulation performance. Although VBF
with broadcast MAC does show a larger amount of leaks, potentially due to the protocol’s
extended complexity, we still see large amounts of memory leaks using broadcast MAC and
FAMA. In all three protocol sets we see a notable amount of leaks, leading us to believe
there are many memory performance issues in Aqua-Sim. In contrast, we review Aqua-Sim
NG’s memory management in Fig. 5.5. For comparability we use the same set of proto-
cols, resulting in about 72,000 bytes of memory leaks among all tests. This value is most
likely due to the phenomenon between the C++ standard library and valgrind, and is thus
ignored. While some of Aqua-Sim NG’s memory improvement is due to reworking parts of
the simulator, the more important reason is easier pointer disposal integration and NS-3’s
overall improved core functionality. We further examine this memory leakage comparison
using the ALOHA protocol set as seen in Fig. 5.6. Here we review lost allocated memory
and still reachable memory at the time of simulation termination. We analyze this leakage
comparison for all three simulators using simulation times of 500 and 10,000 seconds for each.
The collected results lead us to believe that for Aqua-Sim the resulting memory leaks may
be a causality of the core NS-2 and Aqua-Sim framework, since we do not see a substantial
rise when simulation time is increased. However, in SUNSET, we believe that the increase
in lost memory allocation with increased simulation time is strongly correlated with memory
allocation mismanagement.
5.9.2 Simulation Performance
In order to properly review performance we must analyze how a simulator handles scalability.
To acquire this, we use linux’s time system command using the -p option for further precision.
Thus, we are able to measure the entire execution time of each simulation from start to finish.
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Figure 5.4: Aqua-Sim (version 1.0) memory leak tests.
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Figure 5.5: Aqua-Sim NG memory leak tests.
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Figure 5.6: Extended memory leak tests for Aqua-Sim, Aqua-Sim NG, and SUNSET. Lost
represents allocated memory lost during simulation run while reachable shows memory still
accessible at termination.
Scalability testing is performed using broadcast MAC and static routing while we vary the
amount of nodes in our string topology. To properly scale the complexity of each simulation
run we also change the simulation time ranging from 500 to 5,000 seconds, incremented by
100. Additionally, we introduce network strain by ranging network nodes from 10 to 200 for
the various tests. Results for these scalability tests are presented in Fig. 5.7. Due to the
relative ease of simulating 10 nodes, we see similar real time results for both Aqua-Sim and
Aqua-Sim NG. While in the case of 50 or more nodes, Aqua-Sim takes about twice as long
as Aqua-Sim NG to execute. While these results were obtained only using the broadcast
MAC protocol set, we believe that with more complex protocols this scalable performance
disparity would only increase.
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Figure 5.7: Program run time of Aqua-Sim and Aqua-Sim NG using broadcast MAC.
5.9.3 Heap Profile
By misusing the heap, or acquiring a larger peak heap size, we consequently see slower
searching and storing of data. While heap profiling does not depict the main performance
issue among simulators, it can show potential inefficiencies among protocol and core data
structure management. In order to analyze heap usage on each of our tested simulators we
use valgrind’s massif tool. By using this tool we can sample the heap size of the simulation
at given timestamps to assist in profiling heap usage. We first compare Aqua-Sim and Aqua-
Sim NG using the broadcast MAC, FAMA, and VBF protocol sets shown in Fig. 5.8. For
Aqua-Sim NG, we see that for each of these three protocol sets the heap size peaks at around
0.5 MiB. In comparison, Aqua-Sim’s heap size quickly grows and peaks, in the worst case, at
roughly 5.5 MiB for VBF. While in Fig. 5.9 we review the performance of all three simulators
using the ALOHA protocol set. In both SUNSET and Aqua-Sim the heap size gradually
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Figure 5.8: Heap performance for Aqua-Sim and Aqua-Sim NG using various protocols.
increases overtime. We believe this is a result of poor core and protocol data structure
management. In contrast, on Aqua-Sim NG we see a large heap profile improvement, in
part, due to transitioning to NS-3.
5.9.4 Protocol Performance
To ensure consistency among simulator performance it is important to measure protocol
accuracy with the results of other frameworks. To achieve this, we compare packet delay
times using broadcast MAC with VBF routing on Aqua-Sim and Aqua-Sim NG. Since both of
these protocols were previously written in Aqua-Sim 1.0, we can use them as a benchmark to
test Aqua-Sim NG’s protocol reliability and accuracy. Testing is done using a string topology
with each simulation lasting for 400 seconds. Furthermore, we set VBF’s vector width to 40
meters, packet size of 400 bits, modem baud rate of 10 kbps and traffic generation of 0.25
packets per second. Fig. 5.10 and 5.11 show the results for average packet end-to-end delay
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Figure 5.9: Heap performance comparing Aqua-Sim, Aqua-Sim NG, and SUNSET using the
ALOHA protocol.
and average per hop delay, respectively. For both of these graphs we see a gradual delay
increase in correlation to the number of nodes. This connection is related to the propagation,
transmission, and protocol processing delays incurred on both simulators. Additionally, we
see near identical results in both graphs with slight variation in Fig. 5.11 which is most
likely a result of each simulator’s random variable delay.
We further validate Aqua-Sim NG by reviewing average network throughput using the
ALOHA protocol. For comparison purposes, we evaluate previously collected Aqua-Sim and
real testbed results, as seen in [33], to measure the accuracy of Aqua-Sim NG. The network
topology is set up in a pentagon shape consisting of a single sink located in the center.
Simulation parameters include modem baud rate of 80 bps, packet size of 256 bits, and max
retransmissions of 3. In each test we adjust the amount of nodes which are generating traffic.
For Fig. 5.12 every node generates traffic at a rate of 0.02 packets per second, whereas Fig.
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Figure 5.10: End-to-end packet delay of Aqua-Sim and Aqua-Sim NG using VBF and broadcast
MAC protocols.
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Figure 5.11: Average per hop packet delay of Aqua-Sim and Aqua-Sim NG using VBF and
broadcast MAC protocols.
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Figure 5.12: Average network throughput using ALOHA protocol with varying amounts of
traffic generating nodes. Input traffic rate is set to 0.02 packets per second.
5.13 sets the total input traffic at 0.1 packets per second. Therefore, dependent on the
amount of data senders, n, the input traffic of each node is 0.1
n
. In both of these figures,
we see relatively similar results between Aqua-Sim NG, Aqua-Sim, and real testbed results.
Furthermore, there are slight variations among collected Aqua-Sim NG throughput which
we believe is associated with ALOHA protocol’s random variables.
5.10 Discussion and Future Direction
Aqua-Sim NG expands the functionality and usability of the UAN simulator, Aqua-Sim.
By adding diverse modules, based on real-world scenarios, and transitioning this simulator
to work on top of NS-3 we are able to accomplish this expansion. Additionally, we have
shown performance improvements made from adapting this improved network framework.
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Figure 5.13: Average network throughput using ALOHA protocol with varying amounts of
traffic generating nodes. Total input traffic rate is set to 0.1 packets per second.
Furthermore, we have extended the documentation for Aqua-Sim NG, making the task of
learning the simulator to be more intuitive. To meet similar fidelity verification of past
Aqua-Sim versions, it was paramount that we showed Aqua-Sim NG’s accuracy remained
consist throughout architecture improvements and feature additions.
While Aqua-Sim NG has reached a state denoting it as releasable and usable by the
community, there still is work that can be done to improve the current code base. To start,
we believe that the current header implementation is clunky and, therefore, needs to be
cleaned up. Since headers are used across all layers of Aqua-Sim NG we must remove the
redundancy in the core and base classes, independent of layer specific protocols. Further-
more, we must adapt a simpler and more verifiable system for header management. Since
headers are assigned to packets in a single buffer approach, we need a way to verify that
each serialization is never out-of-order and header size stays true to real-world scenarios.
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This could be done through a dedicated singleton pattern approach or other preconstructed
components that properly handle packet headers. Nonetheless, this is an area that requires
further investigation and testing in order to improve Aqua-Sim NG’s code structure.
Visualizing the results of a simulator is a beneficial process in understanding and depict-
ing the tested outcome. In past iterations of Aqua-Sim there existed a dedicated piece of
software which took specialized output, collected during Aqua-Sim executions, and depicted
the results in a three-dimensional, time-dependent space. This software is called Aqua-3D
[128] and is used as a specialized 3D solution to NS-2’s NAM animator which only supports
two-dimensional planes. Since Aqua-3D was first developed in 2009 many of its dependencies
are out of date. Additionally, since this UAN animator was specialized for Aqua-Sim it is
not reusable for Aqua-Sim NG without extensive modifications. Therefore, in future work
we plan to establish support for visualizing results on our current underwater simulator.
Since NS-3 supports Python based animation, this may consist of adapting Python scripts
and animator support into Aqua-Sim NG’s code.
With the expansion of UANs, so comes the unfolding research on varying acoustic propa-
gation models resulting from more unique environments. For example, in arctic environments
typical sound waves may behavior differently due to new factors such as shifting ice covered
sea surfaces. To accompany this, we must vary our currently used propagation models with
specialized range and attribute-based features to fit these more unique cases.
In recent years newer technology has opened the door to more usable mobile nodes
in UANs. For this work, we plan on integrating AUV support in Aqua-Sim NG. While
our current simulator uses NS-3’s mobility model to allow for node movement, it does not
currently have preset support for devices such as AUVs. Instead we plan to incorporate
new AUV models, preset AUV parameters, and provide AUV integrated examples. Thus, a
user or developer could simply include various AUV movement patterns or expand upon the
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currently implemented ones without extensive knowledge of Aqua-Sim NG. This adaption
could, in part, be designed and inherited, from NS-3’s mobility model, to form specialized
movement functions which can be easily assigned to nodes within example scripts. Further
work is necessary in order to construct, complete, and test this AUV module.
Many other UAN simulators, such as SUNSET, currently support code reusability in
testbed scenarios. This requires the use and support of interchangeable code from simulation
runs to acoustic modems without rewriting protocol code. For Aqua-Sim NG no such real-
world executable code currently exists. While providing this functionality could open the
doors to portable code to UAN frameworks like OCEANTUNE [129] or SeaLinx [130]. Since
NS-3 offers a Direct Code Execution (DCE) module, this may be more accessible to Aqua-
Sim NG. While this would require integration of NS-3’s DCE module into Aqua-Sim NG,
it could offer code reusability functionality on certain testbeds. Furthermore, this could be
expanded to support a broad range of different UAN modems, thus making these features
more broadly compatible.
Currently, Aqua-Sim NG’s code repository is an ongoing open-source project. There ex-
ists multiple forks of the project’s repository while contributions are typically given through
email and updated on the master branch accordingly. Main efforts to consistently expand
the code base on Aqua-Sim NG are currently being made by myself, a team of one. Planned
efforts to extend this team have already been arranged with Dr. Zheng Peng and his inter-
ested future students. We plan to continue supporting and expanding Aqua-Sim NG with
this backbone of contributions from Dr. Peng, myself and others within the UAN research
community.
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5.11 Conclusion
Simulators play a large part in theorizing and supporting new research protocols. For UANs,
simulators are especially important due to the sheer cost and upkeep of a large testbed. Aqua-
Sim was originally created to offer a solution through extensive and accurate underwater
simulation. While the UAN community has ensured the expansion of Aqua-Sim, the core
simulator it works upon, NS-2, has since been superseded by NS-3. Almost a decade after
Aqua-Sim was first released, we can see the many limitations of this simulator and, therefore,
have chosen to transition it to NS-3.
In this work, we offer a newly adapted and expanded version of Aqua-Sim, named Aqua-
Sim Next Generation (Aqua-Sim NG). While a large part of this work constituted revamping
Aqua-Sim’s architecture, to meet new NS-3 standards, there were many other components
that required attention. For example, when analyzing each piece of Aqua-Sim’s code we
noticed many sections of redundancy acquired over the many years and various contributors
to the project. Furthermore, many underwater features were missing from the original sim-
ulator. Components such as noise generators, signal cache, and multi-channel support were
added to accommodate these missing traits. Additionally, each protocol had to be thor-
oughly reviewed in order to ensure proper NS-3 API usage and packet management. Other
various additions were made during this creation of Aqua-Sim NG. New modules such as
an attacker module and NDN module were added. For the NDN component, we specialized
the various information-centric features to coincide with underwater attributes while inde-
pendently integrating this module alongside our working UAN architecture. Furthermore,
we extended user and developer documentation to ease the steep learning curve, as seen in
previous versions of Aqua-Sim.
Extensive testing was completed on Aqua-Sim NG to verify simulation performance gains
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and accuracy. We used various MAC and routing protocols in comparison with Aqua-Sim
and a separate UAN simulator, SUNSET. Aqua-Sim NG showed major performance improve-
ments in all testing components which included memory management, heap performance,
and execution time scalability. We also compared delay and throughput accuracy of Aqua-
Sim NG to previous Aqua-Sim and real-world testbed recordings. These results depicted
continuous accuracy among our UAN simulator.
While Aqua-Sim NG has recently reached its version 1.0 release goal there is still much
to be done. Expanding the Aqua-Sim NG team for continuous community engagement and
support is already underway. Additionally, we have extensive plans for new underwater
features and components that can provide easier and more realistic underwater simulation.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Direction
In this dissertation, we aimed to integrate and adapt NDN components in UANs to reap
the beneficial effects. Firstly, we examined the paradigm shift ICNs incorporate compared
with the standard TCP/IP architecture. Furthermore, we discussed the beneficial means of
choosing the information-centric architecture, NDN, for its academia resilience and expand-
ability.
Secondly, we review and introduce TPNDR to mimic similarities of the routing strategy
layer in NDN. TPNDR uses passively stored data to create routing paths for user-initiated
requests. Additionally, we expand upon data naming principles and table usages to encourage
energy efficient transmitting and data discovery. Through simulation results, we are able
to demonstrate that TPNDR can out-perform flooding techniques through improved energy
efficiency. Furthermore, our simulations depict a proof of concept for integrating NDN
concepts to reduce the many limitations of UANs.
Thirdly, we identify the potential security threats of UANs and further incorporate var-
ious NDN concepts to improve upon these shortfalls. By analyzing the differing effects
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from DoS attacks, we are able to incorporate redundancy removal techniques. Furthermore,
our standard algorithm proposed is capable of detecting faulty traffic and take necessary
defensive actions on potential malicious users. We expand this defensive strategy by incor-
porating three behavior analysis algorithms, namely: statistical distribution model, rules
mining model, and support vector machine model. Through these extended behavior recog-
nition sets we are able to show advanced tracking of malicious traits even in more extreme
DoS scenarios.
Lastly, we extend the testing possibilities and effectiveness of UAN simulation by ex-
tensively reworking and enhancing Aqua-Sim. We name this renewed simulator as Aqua-
Sim Next Generation while continuing to maintain the entire code base in an open-source,
academia friendly manner. Aqua-Sim NG provides a more adaptive core API and improved
memory management through its transition to NS-3. Additionally, many redundant sections
of the past simulator are revamped during this reconstruction of Aqua-Sim NG. All previ-
ously supported layer protocols underwent redesigning and API specific adaptation to im-
prove NS-3 functionality and overall architecture modularity. New features were introduced
to Aqua-Sim NG including localization and synchronization support, better signal caching
management, proper busy terminal problem support, multi-channel support, advanced prop-
agation models, external noise generators, channel trace driven support, security module, and
an adapted NDN module. Furthermore, we incorporated extensive documentation to assist
in user and developer understanding and usage of Aqua-Sim NG. Testing results outlined
the major memory management and overall simulation improvements gained. Additionally,
Aqua-Sim NG showed similar validity results to previous iterations of Aqua-Sim depicting
the accuracy of the simulator remained consistent.
Within each previously mentioned section potential future directions of this work are
given. Many of these discussions include improving upon currently used algorithms, adapting
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new algorithms to improve efficiency, or further analyzing proposed work in testbed scenarios.
In terms of TPNDR, we believe that real world testing could further show the benefits of
incorporating NDN techniques in UAN routing. For our DoS security work, we believe
that further behavior analyze algorithms could be incorporated with various and potentially
improved outcomes. And finally, for Aqua-Sim NG, much can be gained by continuing to
expand this UAN simulator. By further expanding the supported tools and protocols on this
simulator, we believe Aqua-Sim NG can better serve the UAN community.
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